OPERATION COMMANDO HUNT SUCCEEDED OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER as the plan to “decrease the logistical flow from North Vietnam by lengthening the time it took the North Vietnamese to move war materials and personnel into South Vietnam.”… On 31 October 1968 President Johnson directed the termination of Operation Rolling Thunder effective 1 November 1968. The decision was made to spur the stalled peace talks ongoing in Paris that had been stalemated for five months. The United States offered to stop the bombing of North Vietnam in exchange for minor concessions by North Vietnam. With the end of Rolling Thunder, the allies shifted to OPERATION COMMANDO HUNT and shifted the interdiction campaign from the “panhandle” of North Vietnam, the 120 miles of North Vietnam north of the 17th Parallel, to the Steel Tiger area of Southern Laos. The air war became a “truck war” and an all out effort to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail between the mountain passes exiting North Vietnam at Nape, Mugia and Ban Karai and south through Laos to South Vietnam. The forces committed to North Vietnamese targets from March 1965 to 1 November 1968 were now committed to the COMMANDO HUNT campaign. Whereas the daily strike sorties “fragged” into Steel Tiger averaged 4,700 in October 1968, more than 12,800 were flown in November 1968. The daily sortie rate jumped to 620. More than 500 additional strike aircraft were available for the task of “slowing the flow” of arms and personnel down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The result was an interdiction effort of “unprecedented scale.” The STEEL TIGER and TIGER HOUND operations were combined with the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps assets from ROLLING THUNDER for the concentrated COMMANDO HUNT “truck war.” The new air war became “less a strategy to defend South Vietnam against communist aggression and more a way to keep the enemy from amassing supplies in position to launch a decisive offensive before the South Vietnamese were able to successfully defend themselves.”
COMMANDO HUNT was waged as seven successive campaigns. HUNT I, III, V and VII were executed in the dry season (November to April) in Laos created by the northeast monsoon that pounded North Vietnam. HUNT II, IV AND VI were executed during the southwest monsoon (May to October) that turned the Ho Chi Minh Trail and southern Laos into mud, and creeks into wide rivers. The seven consecutive campaigns were waged from 11 November 1968 until 29 March 1972 when the North Vietnamese commenced the Easter Offensive of 1972. It is Humble Host’s intention to follow and report the history of the new air war, and the Vietnam war in total, on a weekly basis, as a continuation of the 50th commemoration of the Vietnam war that I began in March 2016… Rolling Thunder Remembered readers are encouraged to read up on COMMANDO HUNT at the following links…
IGLOO WHITE… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Igloo_White
STEEL TIGER… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Steel_Tiger
COMMANDO HUNT… https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Commando_Hunt
THE WEEK OF 1-11 NOVEMBER 1968… HEADLINES FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES…1 Nov: “ATTACKS ON NORTH VIETNAM HALT TODAY–Johnson Says Wider Talks Begin Nov 6–Peace Called the Aim–Saigon and National Liberation Front Can Join In the Enlarged Paris Talks”… “NORTH VIETNAM BOMBED–Final Attacks”… ‘ROCKET ATTACKS ON SAIGON KILL 21–Most Victims At Early Mass–Hue Is Also Shelled With 9 Feared Dead”… Nov 2: “THIEU SAYS SAIGON CANNOT JOIN PARIS PEACE TALKS UNDER PRESENT PLAN–U.S. To Step Up Bombing In Laos–National Liberation Front Is Top Issue–South Vietnam Bars Any Separate Seat For the Vietcong”… “LAOS HO CHI MINH ROUTE TO BE POUNDED TO CUT ENEMY ARMS FLOW”… “RAIDS ENDED, FREEING PLANES FOR USE IN THE SOUTH”… Nov 3: “HANOI INSISTING VIETCONG HAVE FULL VOTING RIGHTS IN TALKS–U.S. Urging Saigon to Join–Thuy Gives View–Four Groups With Right To Speak Must be Seated”… “Ground Fighting Growing In South–Allied Units In Sharp Battles With Enemy Forces”… Nov 4: “NIXON HAS LEAD OVER HUMPHREY IN LATE SURVEY–Contest tightens–GOP Nominee Put Ahead In 30 states and His Rival in 8– Nixon Ahead 42-40 In Final Gallup Poll”… “U.S. TO PRESS PEACE TALKS EVEN IN SAIGON’S ABSENCE–It Plans Discussions On Reducing Levels Of Combat Despite Thieu’s Stand–Official Silence Maintained”… 5 Nov: “NATION WILL VOTE TODAY–CLOSE PRESIDENTIAL RACE PREDICTED IN LATE POLLS–Nixon Urges ‘Fresh Ideas’–100,000 Cheer Humphrey”... 6 Nov: “NIXON-HUMPHREY RACE TIGHT– DEMOCRATS RETAIN CONGRESS–8 States Crucial–Nixon Gain In South Offset By Humphrey Strength In East”… 7 Nov: “NIXON WINS BY THIN MARGIN–PLEADS FOR REUNITED NATION–Goal Is Harmony–President-Elect Vows His Administration Will Be Open”... “TOWN IS ATTACKED IN 3rd DELTA ASSAULT BY ENEMY IN FOUR DAYS–Vietcong Pledges to Fight On in South”… 8 Nov: “NIXON POPULAR LEAD VOTE IS INCREASED TO 270,608–Temporary Humphrey Edge Vanishes After Special Count–Republicans Ahead In Missouri and Alaska”… “January Draft Quota Is Highest Since May ’68″… “EXPECTATION OF NEW TALKS ON WAR IN LAOS GROWS IN VIETNAM”… 9 Nov: “HUMPHREY MEETS NIXON IN FLORIDA, PLEDGES SUPPORT–Proffers Help For An Effective Presidency–President Elect Is Grateful For Statement–Muskie Joins Talk”… “FOES STRONGHOLD POUNDED BY B-52s–Big Bombers Strike at Zone Near Cambodia While Enemy I Said to Mass”… Nov 10: “JOHNSON DECIDES AGAINST PRESSING THIEU–THIEU REPORTED SOME AIDES ARE CONFIDENT OF AN EARLY ACCORD WITH SAIGON ON PEACE TALKS–But Some Counsel Firm U.S. stand–Bunker Sees Vietnam President–President Johnson Patient”… 11 Nov: “JOHNSON-NIXON TALKS TODAY SEEN FOCUSING ON VIETNAM”… “FOE SHELLS TOWN AND THREE BASES SOUTH OF DMZ”…
AIRCRAFT LOSSES 1-11 NOVEMBER 1968… “VIETNAM: AIR LOSSES” (Chris Hobson) There were seven fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia during the period 1-11 November 1968…
(1) On 1 November CAPTAIN G.S. LIBEY, USMC and 1LT W.H. FRIZELL, USMC were flying an F-4J of the VMFA-334 Falcons and MAG-11 out of Danang and were downed while attacking a North Vietnamese position two miles north of the demilitarized zone. They were able to reach the Gulf before having to eject, where both were rescued.
(2) On 5 November VMA-211 lost an A-4E due to engine failure. The pilot ejected off the coast of South Vietnam and was rescued.
(3) On 9 November CAPTAIN ROGER EDWARD WICHMAN was flying an F-100D of the 615th TFS and 35th TFW out of Phan Rang in a flight of F-100s returning from a close air support mission. About 10 miles from the field his aircraft was hit by ground fire. CAPTAIN WICHMAN attempted to stretch his flight in a flaming Super Sabre to land at Phan Rang, but was forced to eject a low altitude and was killed in the incident… CAPTAIN WICHMAN rests in peace at St. Peters Lutheran Cemetery in Pender, Nebraska…
(4) On 9 November an F-4J of VFMA-115 and MAG-15 out of Chu Lai landed in heavy rain and hydroplaned off the runway and burned. Both Marines in the Phantom escaped injury.
(5) On 11 November MAJOR J.R. ALBRIGHT of the 21st TASS and 504th TASG out of Nha Trang was flying an O-1F Bird Dog 15 miles south of Nha Trang when hit by small arms fire that led to engine failure. MAJOR ALBRIGHT executed a crash landing from which he emerged injured but repairable. The O-1 was a strike…
(6) On 11 November CAPTAIN PHILLIP D. BARGER , USMC, was flying an A-4E of the VMA-311 Tomcats and MAG-12 out of Chu Lai on a close air support mission 25 miles northwest of Danang and dropping napalm. On his second pass he was hit by ground fire and was unable to eject before the aircraft crashed killing him. CAPTAIN DENNY BARGER, USMC is buried at Restland Memorial Park in Dallas, Texas…
(7) On 11 November an OV-10A of the 19th TASS and 504th TASG out of Bien Hoa suffered an engine failure during a training flight and both aviators were able to eject and become the first men to survive the crash of an OV-10 Bronco in Southeast Asia.
SUMMARY OF AIRCRAFT LOST DURING THE WEEK+ OF 1-11 NOVEMBER FOR THE YEARS 1965-1968: 1965-12; 1966-24; 1967-19 and 1968-7…. LOSS OF AIRCRAFT IN ROLLING THUNDER= 914… LOSS OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT in the South=316… LOSS OF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT= 920…
FROM THE SOURCES OF COMMANDO HUNT INFORMATION… The series of seven “Project Southeast Asia Checo Reports for Commando Hunt” are a primary source of information and results of each campaign. The premier book on the subject is Bernald C. Nalty’s, THE WAR AGAINST TRUCKS: AERIAL INTERDICTION IN SOUTHERN LAOS, 1968-1972…Humble Host will include a short piece from one of these documents or other materials with each post….
From The War Against Trucks, Nalty: Page 97: “Launching the Truck War… The attempt to impede the passage of men and supplies over the Ho Chi Minh Trail encountered natural obstacles, active and passive defenses put in place by the North Vietnamese, and uncertainties that stemmed from the very composition of the logistic network itself. Throughout the year nature complicated the task of aerial interdiction in southern Laos. When the southwest monsoon was blowing, rain and a thick overcast hampered aerial attack; and even during the dry season, clouds might obscure an important area, such as Ban Karai Pass, although the sky remained clear just a few miles away. Fog often blanketed the twisting valleys during the dry months, combining with dust from road traffic and smoke caused when Montagnards burned away the undergrowth to clear land for farming. The resulting veil could frustrate aerial observation throughout the morning; and after the fog had lifted, the enemy still enjoyed the concealment afforded by layered rain forest, limestone caves, dense underbrush, and finally, by dark night.
“The defenders of the trail used nature to their advantage, operating whenever possible beneath the jungle canopy and when necessary, improving this concealment by the use of trellis work that suspended vines and freshly cut tranches over the roads, trails, supply dumps, and other elements of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Hidden from the naked eye, the aerial camera, and many of the new airborne sensors, the enemy built additional roads and cutoffs when and where he needed them, repaired or improved existing routes, and set up a dispersed web of repair facilities, storage areas, and encampments. Even as he concealed his true activity, the enemy became increasingly skillful at deception, ultimately building entire dummy truck parks, with wooden or canvas vehicles that were visible from the air, but not so obvious as to arouse immediate suspicion. Sometimes the defenders of the trail placed cans of fuel in truck carcasses; when gunfire from attacking aircraft ignite the fuel resulting fire blinded the infrared sensors and created the illusion that a truck had been destroyed.
“As if nature and the enemy’s use of his natural surroundings did not cause difficulty enough, airmen attacking the Ho Chi Minh Trail had to face an expanding array of anti-aircraft guns. In the summer of 1968, during the planning of the northeast monsoon season interdiction campaign that became Commando Hunt, fairly weak antiaircraft defenses guarded the trail, a condition that began changing on the very eve of the operation. President Johnson’s decision to suspend the bombing of North Vietnam, effective November 1,1968, upset the existing balance between offense and defense in southern Laos. Change in policy immediately enabled the United States to hurl an additional 480 aircraft against the transportation complex each day, raising the daily sortie average to 620. So important had the trail become that in June 1969, for instance, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps squadrons flew five times as many sorties against southern Laos as they had in June of the previous year. The enemy, freed from the threat of raids against his homeland, countered this increased activity by moving guns across the border into Laos, strengthening his defenses there from an estimated 166 weapons at the end of November 1968 to a reported 621 at the end of April 1969.”…End quote from Nalty…
Next COMMANDO HUNT post 19 November 1968…
Lest we forget… Bear