COMMANDO HUNT 14-20 APRIL 1969

COMMEMORATING THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIETNAM WAR… (1961-1973)…

LEST WE FORGET… IN THE WEEK ENDING 12 APRIL 1969 AMERICAN FIGHTING FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA LOST 204 WARRIORS KILLED-IN-ACTION and another 963 Wounded-in-Action. Enemy losses were put at 2,890 for the week of war. Humble Host did a little calculation on the suffering on the home front from the 58,400 American battle losses in the Vietnam War. The longest war in American history to that point left more than 58,000 grieving mothers; more than 17,000 new widows; and, more than 30,000 fatherless children. War is merciless in its creation of death, anguish and despair. “Peace is better than war, because in peace the sons bury the fathers, but in war the fathers bury their sons.” (Bacon) ….

Good Afternoon. The Bear is running late (on a torn meniscus)… It is Monday, 8 July 2019. Humble Host remembers the Vietnam War and WEEK TWENTY-THREE  of Operation COMMANDO HUNT I, “…the air campaign that sought to reduce the flow of enemy resources into South Vietnam by destroying trucks and caches of military supplies along the routes leading south while tying down substantial forces and resources supporting and defending the infiltration route structure.” (7AF OpPlan 544-69 Commando Hunt)

HEADLINES FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES for 14 through 20 April 1969…

A.   THE WAR: (14 Apr) 15 G.I.’s KILLED IN BATTLE WITH VIETCONG 45 MILES NORTHWEST OF SAIGON–Enemy Shells 35 Target… “…It was the highest number of Americans killed in a single fight in the area in a single year. The site was within a mile of a similar engagement Saturday in which three Americans were killed. The battle started as the American soldiers sweeping through the area were fired upon by enemy troops in heavily fortified bunkers. In a five-hour battle, the enemy forces used heavy automatic weapons and rocket grenades, while American armed helicopters and jet fighter-bombers pounded the fortifications. When the enemy withdrew they left 11 bodies…. 16 Americans were wounded.”… AIR GUARD UNIT IN VIETNAM BEGINS FLIGHT HOME TO U.S…. “The first of four Air National Guard units activated during the Pueblo crisis last year and sent to South Vietnam began its long return flight home today…”... (15 Apr) AFTER TWO YEARS IN MEKONG DELTA U.S. GOAL IS ILLUSIVE…”…‘Where is the goal, where do you finish, how many more do we kill?’ said a senior American officer who has been in the delta a year.”… FOE BELIEVED TO BE RESUPPLYING AS ATTACKS IN VIETNAM DECLINE…”Enemy mortar and rocket attacks tapered off last night and ground fighting was very slight during the last 24 hours…”… (16 Apr) 198 NORTH VIETNAMESE KILLED IN ATTACK… “…lost 198 men killed in a massive attack against an American infantry camp early this morning…it was the only significant ground action in the last 24 hours….13 American soldiers were killed and three wounded in the two-hour fight.”… (18 Apr) U.S. BATTLE LET-UP IN VIETNAM DENIED–Military Feels Nixon Heeds Arguments of Offensive–Combat Deaths Drop… “High ranking military men here who have been arguing with Nixon Administration officials against a cutback in offensive operations believe that their views have prevailed….Allied units are continuing to patrol, pursue and engage the enemy aggressively… Under this policy, American deaths dropped last week to their lowest level in seven weeks…204 Americans were killed compared with weekly death tolls as high as 453 in late February and early March…Enemy losses were reported as 2,890.”… (19 Apr) G.I.’s REPORT KILLING 82 OF FOE AFTER DISCOVERING A BASE CAMP–Air Strikes Increased…”United States tanks and armored troop carriers ran into a hidden North Vietnamese base camp 50 miles northwest of Saigon yesterday and killed 82 enemy soldiers in a running battle.”… “B-52 bomber strikes increased from four Wednesday to seven yesterday.”… “There were 20 enemy mortar and rocket attacks throughout South Vietnam.”… (20 Apr) U.S. UNITS REPORT TWO HEAVY BATTLES–Total of Vietnam Shellings Not Given as Lull Holds… “In the ground war, a North Vietnamese army force staged a heavy ground assault against a temporary United States Marine Corps and Army camp about three miles south of the DMZ. The enemy killed 23 and wounded 23 before being driven off. The bodies of five enemy soldiers were found after the fight… United States infantrymen and artillery killed 14 enemy soldiers in a four-hour engagement 14 miles southwest of Tamky, about 45 miles south of Danang.”…

B.   PEACE TALKS IN PARIS:  (14 Apr) NORTH VIETNAM VISIT DENIED BY KISSINGER… “…today denied repeated contentions of Harvard University officials that he had visited North Vietnam secretly on a peace-seeking mission for President Johnson. The White House reported: Dr. Kissinger has never been to North Vietnam in his life.”… (18 Apr) HANOI AND VIETCONG ADAMANT AT PARIS… “North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, or Vietcong, rejected today allied proposals for mutual troop withdrawals at the 13th plenary session of the peace talks. The Hanoi-Vietcong side reiterated earlier demands that all United States forces in South Vietnam must leave unconditionally and at once. The meeting in the French Government’s International Conference center thus ended with no program….Allied analysts said later that the other side’s remarks on this subject justified faint hope for progress in some future negotiation on a reciprocal pullout from the South.”… (19 Apr) VIETNAM PEACE PROSPECTS SAID TO IMPROVE–President Attributes Gains to Greater Saigon Stability But Bars Troop Cut Now… “President Nixon said at his news conference today that he felt the prospects for peace had significantly improved since he took office, largely because of what he termed a greater political stability in the Saigon government and an improvement in its armed forces…These developments had enabled the South Vietnamese President, Nguyen Van Thieu to take a more flexible negotiating position, primarily in agreeing to secret talks withe the Vietcong.”…

C.   THE REST OF THE HEADLINES… (14 Apr) PRAGUE WILL JOIN BLOC MANEUVERS BEGINNING TODAY–Soviet, Hungary, Poland and ‘Other Countries” to Hold Antiaircraft Exercises–Russia Is In Command–Games To End Wednesday–Report of Troop Buildup Is Still Unexplained… “The Defense Ministry announced today that Czechoslovakia would join new Warsaw Pact maneuvers with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Poland and presumably Bulgaria and East Germany….all five of the countries that participated in the invasion of Czechoslovakia last August 20-21 are to begin an exercise to improve antiaircraft defenses… “… BILLY CASPER LOSES HIS TOUCH AT MASTERS–Pace Setter Loses to George Archer–Ties for Second With Weiskopf and Knudson (Top money was $20,000, the three at #2 earned $12,333 each)… SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT PUZZLES TOP U.S. ANALYSTS… “The scope and nature of Soviet strategic weapons deployment has puzzl;ed senior Government analysts to the point where it may play an important role in the Administration’s fight for a antiballistic missile system.”… HEAD START PUPILS FOUND NO BETTER OFF THAN OTHERS…  RIVERS IN MIDWEST PRESS AGAINST BOLSTERED DIKES… (15 Apr) PRESIDENT OFFERS 10-POINT PROGRAMS IN DOMESTIC AREA–In Message To Congress Proposes Tax Reform and Rise in Social Security–Details Expected Soon–Transit Plan, Aid to States Crime Curb and Equal Job Opportunity Also Cited… 20 NEGROES STAGE A COLUMBIA SIT-IN–Occupied Admissions Office to Back Demand For Voice In Recruting Blacks…  2 CHICAGO POLICEMEN SLAIN BY SNIPER… NAVY SILENT ON TALK OF A PUEBLO VERDICT… (16 Apr) U.S. SCOUT PLANE WITH 31 IS LOST, REPORTED DOWN BY 2 NORTH KOREAN MiGS—Wide Hunt for Survivors Begins–Navy Sights Debris–2 Soviet Vessels Guided to Area… “North Korea asserted today that it had shot down a United States Navy electronic intelligence plane. The Nixon Administration is said to believe that the plane with a crew of 31 was attacked by two MIG jets off the Korean coast. North Korea said that the four-engine EC-121 aircraft based in Japan had intruded into its airspace and was downed with “one shot” … Pentagon spokesman said that an air-sea search for survivors had begun in an area centered about 75 miles off North Korea in the Sea of Japan. Later the Defense Department reported a sighting of debris that it said could be associated with the missing aircraft…120 miles southeast of Chongjin, North Korea. The search plane did not report any evidence of survivors.”… (17 Apr) U.S. TO EMPHASIZE DIPLOMATIC STEPS ON LOSS OF PLANE–Conflict With North Koreans Considered Undesirable–Apology May Be Sought–Searchers Find Debris–All Of Crew Is Presumed To Have Perished–Rescue Vessels Continue Effort… READINESS OF U.S. FAST REACTION FORCES IN KOREA STEPPED UP–Newspapers In Seoul Demand Action… JAPAN ADVISES U.S. AGAINST REPRISAL… (18 Apr) U.S. AT MEETING IN KOREA PROTESTS DOWNING OF PLANE–Measures To Prevent Similar Incidents In Future Demanded In Panmunjom–Scouting Flights in Area Halted… SIRHAN CONVICTED OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER–Jury To Fix Fate–Will Rule Whether Slayer of Robert Kennedy Gets Life Term Or Goes To Gas Chamber–Killer Takes Verdict Calmly… DUBCEK IS OUSTED AS PRAGUE YIELDS TO THE RUSSIANS–To Remain In Party’s Ruling Presidium–Husak Gets First Secretary Post in Czechoslovakia–Successor Urges Calm–He Promises To Work For Liberalization As Soon As Present Crisis Ends… ABOLITION OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE GAINS IN HOUSE…  (19 Apr) NIXON DECLARES U.S. WILL PROTECT PLANES OFF KOREA–At His News Conference He Announces Reconnaissance Flights Will Be Resumed–Jets to Accompany EC-121s– Naval Task Force to Furnish Support… PRESIDENT VOWS TO FIGHT FOR ABM ‘AS HARD AS I CAN’–Warns Against Hampering A Future President With a Second Class Posture… PLAN TO END TAX ON POOR DRAFTED BY WHITE HOUSE–President Intends To Send Interim Reform Package To Congress On Monday–A Pledge On Surcharge–President Asserts It Should Be Removed as Soon As We Are Able… NEGRO COEDS HOUSE IS TARGET OF A CROSS-BURNING AT CORNELL... (20 Apr) NIXON’s RESPONSE ON EC-121 DOWNING DISAPPOINTS SEOUL —Officials Say He Expected Punitive action By U.S. against North Korea… CORNELL NEGROES SEIZE A BUILDING–30 Visiting Parents Ejected As 100 Students Protest Discipline of 6 Blacks… AUSTRALIANS DEBATE THE ROLE OF THEIR ARMY IN THE VIETNAM WAR…

II.  COMMANDO HUNT I … The following has been snipped from a 50-page document in the archives at Texas Tech’s expanding collection in their Vietnam Center and Archive.

https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/1683/168300010912.pdf

Humble Host snips and quotes start on page 38:

COMMANDO HUNT: After North Vietnam was placed out of reach of U.S. airstrikes on 1 November 1968, the air interdiction campaign shifted from Route Package 1 across the Annam Mountain range to the COMMANDO HUNT area of the Lao panhandle. Far from being an isolated effort, the COMMANDO HUNT campaign was tied directly to the in-country war. This connection was highlighted by the Commander, Seventh Air Force:

“The current air interdiction campaign in Laos could go down as one of the most significant actions of the war, and I emphasize that the North Vietnamese logistic flow through southern Laos must be reduced to a point where it cannot support offensive military actions by the communists in South Vietnam. Should the campaign fail to reach that objective, the result will be renewed military action by the communists in South Vietnam, with the objective of defeating the accelerating pacification program which is of such importance.”…

Located west of the DMZ and extending from the DMZ northward to 18-degrees North and Southward to 16-degrees North, the COMMANDO HUNT region contained the major entry ways from NVN into Laos (Nape, Mugia, and Ban Karai passes) and the key exits from Laos into I Corps. The goal of the COMMANDO HUNT I campaign (15 Nov 68-15 Apr 69) was to reduce the NVA logistical flow by increasing the time it took the enemy to move supplies into RVN and by destroying trucks and other military supplies along the routes which led into the south.

PLANNING: Control of COMMANDO HUNT operations was the responsibility of the 7AF Command Center. TAsk Force Alpha (TFA), located at Nakhon Phanom, functioned as an Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) to exploit sensor information developed by the IGLOO WHITE system.

To determine the criteria for force allocation, four categories of targets were established with the following order of priority: (1) Interdiction Points– 40 per cent air effort: (2) Truck parks and storage areas– 33 percent; Moving trucks–15 to 20 per cent; and (4) AAA Defenses–5 to 10 per cent.

Ten interdiction or Traffic Control Points (TCP) were selected where the LOCs ran through narrow passes or along mountain sides which when closed, forced enemy traffic to back up into truck parks and storage areas, making it a better target of airstrikes. To the destruction of truck parks and storage areas, the U.S. devoted 35 per cent of its tac air and most of the B-52 strikes. Since these storage areas, unlike other types of targets, could be struck at any time of the day and in most kinds of weather, they provided alternate targets for diverted aircraft, thereby increasing the flexibility of strike planning.

Air resources were integrated for the combined truck-killing campaign against the third category of targets. RF-4s and other jets kept the trucks off the roads during the day. Defoiliation thinned out the thick jungle canopy along the routes, exposing enemy trucks at night to attacks by predominately slower-moving aircraft (A-26s, A-1s, B-57s, and AC-123/130 gunships). By detecting vibrations of moving trucks, IGLOO WHITE sensors provided intelligence which assisted strike, FAC, and gunship aircraft to locate the vehicles. Included in the fourth category of targets (AAA) were weapons ranging in size from 12.7mm to 57mm, which were located along the main route structure below Mugia and Ban Karai Passes and around Tchepone (West of DMZ). The percentage of aircraft sent against these guns varied with the intensity of the enemy AAA firing.

THE CAMPAIGN: By May 1969, the COMMANDO HUNT campaign had passed through three distinct phases. Throughout the first phase, which lasted until the end of 1968, the TCPs received the major emphasis, and traffic was successfully blocked at the key interdiction points. At the same time, airstrikes against trucks, truck parks, and storage areas destroyed large quantities of enemy material. An average of 124 strike sorties each day and 40 at night (50 per cent of the total) struck the interdiction points. By mid-December, it was estimated from sensor information, NVA truck movement had been slowed to the point where the enemy required between six and eight days to move his supplies from Mugia Pass into South Vietnam–a journey that had taken two to four days one year earlier. The NVA gradually adapted to the situation by building bypasses and stationing work crews near the target areas to repair the flooded roads. During the last two weeks of the year, enemy truck traffic was again on the rise.

The U.S. response came during the second phase of COMMANDO HUNT, January to February 1969, when more flexibility was introduced into the operation. Target priorities were made less rigid and could be changed when necessary to counter enemy reactions. Now interdiction points were established and a higher priority was given to striking stockpiles behind them. Nightly strikes on convoys and vehicles continued in an effort to reduce further the enemy’s truck inventory and to funnel his traffic into more desirable strike areas. The rules of Engagement were relaxed. Positive control areas, ten miles along the eastern border of Laos were opened for interdiction strikes. FACs were no longer needed for attacks on TCPs. Special ARC LIGHT Operating Areas (SALOAs) were established in which multiple strikes could be made without the need for new validation for each strike. Greater reliance was placed on information derived from IGLOO WHITE sensors, which had the advantage over other intelligence sources of providing near real-time information on enemy traffic patterns, truck parks, storage areas, bypasses, and new routes.

Several of the techniques used during the second phase were refined during the final phase of the campaign (Mar-Apr 69). Important advances were made in the use of sensor information. Individual sensors were closely monitored, and interpreters were able to determine vehicle speed and predict when trucks would pass each subsequent sensor in the string. New storage areas and routes were pinpointed by the sensors. A modification  was also made in the tactics used to attack interdiction points. Emphasis shifted from attacks on Traffic Control Points to attacks on Traffic Control Areas (TCAs). Special munition packages containing antipersonnel as well as antivehicular munitions were dropped in these areas to prevent enemy crews from moving in to repair the roads immediately after they were closed. Experiments with long-range navigation (LORAN) improved the package concept by allowing munitions to be delivered regardless of weather conditions.

RESULTS: In the five months of the COMMANDO HUNT I campaign, 67,094 tactical sorties and 3,811 B-52 sorties were flown against LOCs, truck parks, storage areas, moving trucks, and AAA in STEEL TIGER–nearly all ion the COMMANDO HUNT area. Tactical air alone accounted for a daily average of 46 road and bridge cuts. More than 4,300 trucks were destroyed and over 1,600 damaged. Analysts at 7AF estimated that only 18 per cent of the enemy’s logistical input to Laos reached South Vietnam. The remaining 82 per cent was either destroyed (47 per cent), consumed in the system (29 per cent), or put into storage (6 per cent).

The effect on the enemy’s activity in RVN was dramatic. Since his Lao pipeline was plugged at the northern end, he had to supply his troops in South Vietnam from the material already stored in Laos. Hiss inability to increase his stockpiles in South Vietnam prevented him from raising the level of combat activity between January and April or from maintaining the same level of combat after the arrival of the southwest monsoon season in April. These results were achieved through a combination of interdiction attacks in the COMMANDO HUNT area and combat operations in South Vietnam. General Creighton Abrams, Jr., COMUSMACV, later emphasized the partnership between air interdiction and ground combat, and its success in this campaign:

“The air effort in Laos during the dry season was to interdict. In 1968, the program was successful. We know this, because when the dry season was over, the enemy didn’t have enough supplies in SVN to meet his purpose during the wet season. He, of course, planned for a certain amount of losses, but I think his losses exceeded what he had planned for his operations in upper II Corps and I Corps. In 1968, the effort was also successful because of a good combination of pressure on the ground, finding the enemy’s supplies and making him use it up, and the air interdiction in Laos.”…   End Quote…

III.   AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 14-20 APRIL 1969… References include Chris Hobson’s history of the air war in Southeast Asia, VIETNAM AIR LOSSES. Other sources include POW Network documentation. During the week ending 20 April 1969 the United States lost seven fixed wing aircraft and three bravehearts…

(1) On 16 April an O-2A of the 19th TASS and 504th TASG out of Bien Hoa piloted by FAC CAPTAIN WILLIAM O. BURKETT and CAPTAIN LEON J. PIERCE was launched from Bien Hoa to control a strike mission on a Vietcong bunker complex 15 miles east of Saigon. They dived on the target to mark it for the fighters overhead and were hit by small arms fire in the starboard wing. The aircraft did not recover from the dive and neither braveheart escaped the aircraft before it crashed in the target area. The bodies of both aviators were recovered and CAPTAIN BURKETT rests in peace at Riverview Cemetery in Aurora, Illinois, glory gained, duty done. CAPTAIN PIERCE is buried at Fort Leavenworth National Cemetery among other fallen warriors…

(2) On 16 April an F-4D of the 25th TFS and 8th TFW out of Ubon was lost on a COMMANDO HUNT mission near the Mugia pass. MAJOR D.W. WINKELS and WSO CAPTAIN R.P. ANDERSON were hit while making a second attack on a storage area target. MAJOR WINKELS was able to fly the Phantom west to Thailand before the aircraft became unflyable. The two aviators ejected successfully and were rescued by an HH-3E to fly and fight again…

(3) On 16 April an F-100D Super Sabre of the 309th TFS and 31st TFW out of Tuy Hoa piloted by 1LT ROBERT VINCENT WILLETT, JR. was lost on a night strike on a COMMANDO HUNT mission in southern Laos. The target was a truck convoy near Tavouac. 1LT WILLETT was observed to enter a diving attack on the trucks from 5,000-feet, take a hit from a 37mm antiaircraft position, and continue into the ground. He was not seen to eject and his body has never been recovered. Apparently he was in the status of Missing in Action for several years because his current status is at the rank of Major. Memorials for MAJOR WILLETT are located at the Court of the Missing in Honolulu and The Montana Veterans Memorial in Great Falls. MAJOR WILLETT was left behind… The search goes on, one hopes… DPAA status? Active?

(4) On 16 April an OV-10A of the 19th TASS and 504th TASW out of Bien Hoa and an A-1G collided in mid-air and the pilot of the OV-10A Bronco ejected to be rescued. The aircraft was destroyed. The Skyraider was damaged but landed safely… A ruined day for two fearless aviators…

(5) On 17 April an RF-4C of the 14th TRS and 432nd TRW out of Udorn crewed by CAPTAIN R. BARTHOLOMEW and CAPTAIN B.F. DOYLE were downed on a dawn COMMANDO HUNT photo recce mission to cover route 912 west of the Ban Karai pass in the heart of “Indian Country.” They were hit by automatic weapon fire as they flew near Ban Topen at 3,500-feet. CAPTAIN BARTHOLOMEW was able to keep the Photo Phantom airborne long enough to exit Laos and enter Thailand where they were forced to eject 10 miles short of Ubon, within sight of a runway and landing. They were rescued to fly and photo again…

(6) On 17 April an F-4C of the 558th TFS and 12 TFW out of Cam Ranh Bay piloted by CAPTAIN J.L. BEAVERS and WSO 1LT G.K. MUELLNER was downed by small arms fire while making a fourth pass on an enemy bunker complex 15 miles southwest of Katum. After being hit CAPTAIN BEAVERS turned toward Tan Son Nhut with the hope of an emergency landing. Unfortunately, the Phantom had to be abandoned four miles from TSN. Both aviators were rescued by a U.S. Army helo. CAPTAIN BEAVERS would be shot down and recovered on a second combat tour in August 1972… oohrah…

(7) On 17 April an O-1F Bird Dog of the 504th TASG out of Da Lat was destroyed on the ground by a Vietcong rocket attack on the strip 40 miles northwest of Phan Rang…

HUMBLE HOST END NOTE… The following clip is from an “Indochina Monograph” from the U.S. Army Center of Military History:

RLG MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE

The author was the number two general in the Royal Laotian Army during the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brig. Gen. Soutchay Vongsavanh. Humble Host suggests this forthright charge by General Vongsavanah belongs among the lessons learned from our war in Southeast Asia in the chapter called: “How Not to Win a War,” or conversely, “How To Lose a War.”…..

I quote from page 29 of the General’s Monograph…

“One might expect that since Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were each engaged in a war for their survival as free, independent, non-Communist states against the enemy, North Vietnam, and each was supported by the same great power, the United States, that some extraordinary and effective systems and procedures to coordinate the common effort for the common good must have been devised by them and vigorously supported by the United States. Remarkably, and unfortunately, this was not the case. There was virtually no coordination of combat activity against the North Vietnamese, no communication between the armed forces below the head-of-government level, and very little exchange of information between them.” Unquote…

NAPOLEON on UNITY OF COMMAND… “…is essential to the economy of time. Warfare in the field was like a siege: by directing all one’s force to a single point a breach might be made and the equilibrium of opposition destroyed.”

WIKIPEDIA on UNITED OF COMMAND… “In military organization, unity of command is the principle that subordinate members of a structure should all be responsible to a single commander.”… and… “The military of the United States considers UNITY OF COMMAND as one of the twelve principles of joint operations: “Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for UNITY OF EFFORT becomes paramount. Unity of effort–the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization–is the product of successful unified action.’…”…

South Vietnam–Laos–Cambodia… Think of them as dominoes and part and parcel of the “Domino Theory.”…  Set up with gaps between dominoes can be made to fall. Blocked together they will stand together… Brig. Gen. Vongsavanh’s document has laid bare a major error in the conduct of American foreign and military affairs in the years leading up to, and in, the early years of the U.S commitment of troops to the land war in Southeast Asia…. Shame…

The entire 130-page manuscript is available at:

https://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/reports/images.php?img=/images/2770/27700542001.pdf

Lest we forget…     Bear