Bear Taylor 
COMMANDO HUNT and ROLLING THUNDER REMEMBERED… (15-30 Sept 69)…
LEST WE FORGET… VIETNAM WAR BATTLE DEATHS FOR 15-29 Sept 1969… United States, South Vietnamese and enemy (NORTH VIETNAM and VIETCONG) losses: 278 Americans were killed in action, 847 South Vietnamese were killed and enemy losses were put at 4,652… Total Americans killed in action for the war is now at 38,728. Enemy losses for the war to date are recorded as 553,801.”… Graham Greene, British novelist wrote after visiting Indochina in 1954: “The war will be decided by men who never waded waist-deep in fields of paddy, struggled up mountain sides, been involved in the middle of an attack or the long boredom of waiting.”…
Good Morning. Humble Host remembers the FORTY-FIFTH and FORTY-SIXTH weeks of the campaign to interdict the supply lines of the North Vietmanese as they pressed their war against South Vietnam. The campaign to counter the enemy use of the Ho Ch Minh Trail through Southern Laos was called COMMANDO HUNT…(see previous posts for week one and two of September 1969)
I. PAGE ONE HEAD LINES FROM The NEW YORK TIMES for 15 through 30 September 1969… (15th) GENERAL ABRAMS PAYS THIEU VISIT UPON RETURN–U.S. Commander Thought To Be Relaying Nixon’s View On Withdrawals–They Talk 70-minutes–25 Rocket Attacks Reported Overnight Against Allied Installations and Towns… ISRAELIS PRESS RAIDS ON U.A.R. COAST… NEW ULSTER RIOTING IN IRELAND DELAYS REMOVAL OF BARRICADES–Shooting Death of Two British Soldiers Adds to Tension… (16th) NIXON WILL ANNOUNCE CUT IN VIETNAM FORCE TODAY–Ky Puts Figure at 40,000… THANT ASKS FOR VOICE IN U.N. FOR CHINA ON ARMS TO END ‘MAD RACE’–On Eve of General Assembly He Urges Negotiation Role For All Nuclear Powers… (17th) NIXON ANNOUNCES NEW VIETNAM CUT OF ABOUT 35,000–Says The Troops Ceiling Will Be Reduced to Total Of 484,000… MOON ASTRONAUTS CHEERED IN CONGRESS… ROGERS AT U.N. ASKS GROMYKO TO HELP END THE WAR… UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPONS BLAST SHAKES WESTERN STATES… (18th) LAIRD INDICATES SHARP DRAFT CUT IN MONTHS AHEAD–Inductions May Be Reduced As Much As Two-thirds To 9,000-10,000 Men… (19th) NIXON ASKS U.N. MEMBERS ON VIETNAM PEACE–Urges Them To Use Best Diplomatic Efforts to Get Hanoi To Respond… GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE OPENS… KENNEDY DECRIES NIXON WAR POLICY–Asks Pullout If Thieu Bars A Sensible Compromise… HOUSE APPROVES DIRECT ELECTION OF PRESIDENT–Constitutional Amendment To End Electoral College Is Voted 330 to 70–Senate Action In Doubt… NEW U.S. PULLOUT SCORNED BY NORTH VIETNAMESE AT PARIS PEACE TALKS… (20th) NIXON CUTS DRAFT CALLS BY 50,000 FOR THIS YEAR–Pledges Basic Reforms… GROMYKO REBUFFS U.S. BID FOR CURB ON MIDEAST ARMS–Russians at U.N. Reiterate Demand That Israel Quit Occupied Territories–Ignors Nixon’s Appeal For Assistance In Bringing War To an End… (21st) FIVE VIETNAM ALLIES WON’T CUT TROOPS DESPITE U.S. MOVE–Foreign Ministers Agree To Maintain Force of Over 70,000 Men… TWENTY-FIVE MARINES KILLED IN HEAVIEST OVERNIGHT SHELLINGS IN FOUR MONTHS… U.S. MILITARY SPURS CAMPAIGN TO CURB MARIJUANA IN VIETNAM… HANOI SAYS NIXON SPEECH AT U.N. FULL OF LIES… (22nd) HANOI DENOUNCES U.S. WITHDRAWAL OF 35,000 TROOPS IS TRICK–Says Nixon’s Latest Order Will Really Prolong War of Aggression… DRUG DRIVE STARTS AT MEXICAN BORDER--Operation Seeks To Cut Illicit Flow Of Marijuana, Heroin and Pep Pills… (23rd) PENTAGON TO CUT STRENGTH OF AIR FORCE AND MARINES–Economy Steps Involve 50,000 Airmen and 20,300 In Marines Corps, Plus 209 Planes and 22 Navy Ships… SOVIET NOT READY TO MEET WITH U.S. ON LIMITING ARMS–Gromyko Informed Rogers of New Delays In Talks… (24th) NIXON BACKS SST–Battle For Funds Looms In Congress… (25th) G.O.P. NAMES HUGH SCOTT AS SENATE LEADER–Griffin As Whip–Moderate Republicans Gain Control After 25 Years Of Conservative Rule… (26th) NIXON SEEKS LINK IN SOCIAL SECURITY TO COST OF LIVING–Asks 10% Rise In Benefits March 1 and Automatic Raises In Future… MRS. GOLDA MEIR GREETED WARMLY BY NIXON–Seeks U.S. Pledge–Asks A Long-Range Military and Economic Commitment–She Sees Secretary of State Rogers, Too… BATTLE ACTIVITY LOW IN VIETNAM–Acts of Terrorism Continue… (27th) NIXON ASKS PUBLIC TO GIVE HIM TIME FOR ENDING WAR–Other Side Will Negotiate Only If U.S. Backs His Proposals, He Insists–President Asserts Campus Protests Will Have No Effect On His Policy… DEMOCRATS BACK VIETNAM PROTESTS–Move By Group In Congress Could Confront President With A Partisan Issue… COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY SENATE CALLS FOR END OF WAR… (28th) THIEU SAYS SOUTH VIETNAM CANNOT FIGHT ALONE BY THE END OF 1970–But He Asserts Vietnamese Given U.S. Equipment Will Assume Bulk Of Combat–Sees Pullout Delays… WAR PROTEST LEADERS DENOUNCE NIXON’s RIGID VIETNAM STANCE… FIGHTING IN VIETNAM IS AT REDUCED LEVELS… VIETCONG IN PARIS DENOUNCING NIXON–Say His Stand On Withdrawal Shows Obstinacy… LAOS: Growing American Involvement In Another War… MUSKIE TOPS POLL OF 1972 DEMOCRATS–He, Kennedy and Humphrey Trail Nixon In Survey… (29th) LAIRD GIVES BACK KEY BUDGET ROLE TO THE MILITARY–Young Civilian ‘Whiz Kids’ Of McNamara’s Era Are Assigned Lesser Task–Changes in Style Seen–National Security Council’s Guidance Also Stressed–Nixon’s Vow Kept... B-52 RAIDS CONTINUE DESPITE ENEMY LULL… NEGRO AIDES FIND GAIN UNDER NIXON–9 High Officials Emphasize Pragmatic Approach That Focuses On Getting Jobs… (30th) MRS. GOLDA MEIR HAILED BY NEW YORK CITY–Tells U.N. Israel Wants Peace… G.O.P. ASKS WAR FOES TO WAIT–Democrats Debate New Attack on Nixon Policies… PULLOUT OF MARINES FROM VIETNAM STARTS TODAY… HANOI IS ANGERED BY P.O.W. WIVES’ PLANS–Delegation In Paris Accuses U.S. Of Using Sentiment…
II. COMMANDO HUNT II (April-November 1969)… The following is extracted from the Headquarters, PACAF Air Operations Southeast Asia Summary for September 1969. The document is available at the USAF Historical Research Agency at Maxwell AFB… The monthly reports included a section covering reconnaissance operations over the North (Rolling Thunder)… quoted..
“The reconnaissance effort over North Vietnam continued in September at a slightly reduced rate. Special reconnaissance consisting of nine GIANT SCALE missions and 26 BUMPY ACTION drone sorties. Five of the 26, all low altitude, did not return and one drone was lost during recovery.
“Tactical reconnaissance sorties scheduled over North Vietnam decreased from 273 in August to 253 in September. The decrease was primarily attributable to less favorable weather. The USAF scheduled 114 sorties, the USN 109 and the USMC 30. Total number of missions scheduled was 7.4% less than those scheduled in August.
“Tactical reconnaissance sorties flown over North Vietnam dropped from 229 in August to 144 in September, a decrease of 37%. The USAF flew 70 of the 144, the USN 54 and the USMC 20. There were also three ECM/ELINT and 24 ARDF sorties flown over NVN in September. This compared to 73 of these sorties flown in August.
“Success rates are not available for USN and USMC aircraft, but 53 of the 70 USAF tactical recce missions were successful. Weather was the principal reason for reduced success. Favorable conditions over all of Route Package I in September existed only 56% of the time compared with 67% in August. In addition, the mountainous (western) portion of RP I had favorable weather only 36% of the time while the coastal area was favorable 75% of the time. All of the cross-border targets are located in the western sector of NVN.
“The Navy reported two AA reactions to recce overflights. Muzzle flashes without tracers were sighted west of Route 15 near Pape Pass on one occasion and near Ha Tinh (SE of Vinh) on another. No ordnance was expended by escort aircraft in either case. In addition to the above a USN A-4 Iron Hand aircraft fired a Shrike missile at a strong Firecan radar signal, also south of Vinh.
“GIANT SCALE and BUMPY ACTION sorties covered all of North Vietnam. Of the 26 drones 16 guided over Route packages V and VI. In the last few days of the month drones were scheduled along NVN Route 15 and 7 leading from Vinh through the Barthelemey Pass into Barrel Roll. These missions were an effort to detect enemy action against OPERATION ABOUT FACE in northern Laos. Coverage in RP I was concentrated on LOCs, storage areas, and major cross-border routes. SAM sites in the DMZ were photographed again this month to insure their inactivity in the light of increasing B-52 strikes in northern I CTZ. Analysis of the results of the reconnaissance revealed that the North Vietnamese are expanding apprecialby efforts to improve the cross-border routes on both sides of the Laotian border. Personnel, bulldozers, and new graveling and corduroying of roadbeds were observed. The improvements were particularly heavy in the vicinity of the Mu Gia Pass and Ban Karai passes.
“Photographic coverage of the NVN provided strong evidence that the North Vietnamese are pre-positioning supplies for early movement into Laos and then south to the RVN. At the northern end of Route 137 photography revealed 28 4,000-gallon POL tanks, increasing the known POL support for Route 137 by 360 metric tons of storage capability. Along Route 15 at Xom Ca Trang tank storage and stacks of 55-gallon drums equal nearly 95,000 gallons of POL. This is in addition to the existing POL pipeline along Route 15 which can provide POL directly from Vinh (to Mu Gia Pass)… Photography of the Mu Gia Pass area also revealed a considerable quantity of supply storage. Photo Interpreters counted more than 200 buildings, bunkers and storage revetments along Route 15. In all, an estimated 1700 metric tons of supplies are currently along route 15; stored north of the border due to the impassable road conditions in Laos. This quantity of supplies, exclusive of POL, converted to truck loads approximates the amount moved last May by the North Vietnamese through the Mu Gia Pass into Laos.
“The situation on Route 137 north of Ban Karai Pass was quite similar– 1200 metric tons of supply storage, exclusive of POL, have been identified concealed under foliage. The Route 137 pre-positioned supply tonnage, in truck loads, approximates the sensor measured ‘input’ into the Laos panhandle during May from Ban Karai Pass.
“In summary, the volume of supply storage on Routes 15 and 137, the storage of supporting POL and the extensive road repair efforts indicates that the North Vietnamese are preparing for large scale movements of material into Laos. This could occur when the monsoon shifts and road conditions improve enough to support heavy truck traffic.”… end quote…
III. AIRCRAFT LOSSES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: 15-30 September 1969…References include Chris Hobson’s updated history of the Vietnam air war, VIETNAM AIR LOSSES, which is available on line at https://www.VietnamAirLosses.com …During the two-week period ending 30 September eight fixed wing aircraft were lost and four USMC aviators were killed-in-action conducting air operations in Southeast Asia. Detailed accounts of the eight aircraft losses are at Hobson. The four intrepid Marines who did not come home are remembered here…
19 September 1969… CAPTAIN WALTER VANN LEMMOND, USMC, and 1LT ROBERT EDWARD LAVENDER, USMC, were killed when their F-4 Phantom of the VFMA-314 Black Knights was downed by enemy groundfire returning from a night TPQ-10 radar bombing mission. The F-4 went down in the mountains near Hill 906 about 10 miles west of Chu Lai in bad weather while executing a TACAN instrument approach to the field. Their bodies were recovered and returned to the United States. CAPTAIN VANN LEMMOND rests in peace at the Gardens of Faith in Lumberton, North Carolina. 1LT LAVENDER, DFC, is buried at Memorial Cemetery, Montgomery, Alabama…
29 September 1969… MAJOR LUTHER ALBERT LONO, USMC, and 1LT PATRICK ROBERT CURRAN, USMC, of the VMA(AW)-242 Batmen perished on a night A-6A Intruder COMMANDO HUNT mission in a heavily defended area about 27 miles west of Khe Sanh. They were working with a FAC when contact was lost. There was a brief emergency transmission but search and rescue efforts found no trace of the aircraft or the two Marine aviators at the time of the loss. They were listed as Missing-in-Action. The crash site was found in 1999 and subsequent excavations to a depth of 12 feet yielded conclusive proof of the aircraft identification and aircrew boots and clothing, but no conclusive human remains. Humble Host recommends readers refer to the Arlington National Website for a complete story of the last flight of LIEUTENANT COLONEL LONO and MAJOR CURRAN and the relentless search for and effort to recover their remains. Despite those efforts they remain “missing.” They are memorialized and remembered with a headstone at Arlington National Cemetery bearing both their names…. read at…
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lalono.htm
IV. HUMBLE HOST END NOTE… In an earlier post I suggested some vacation homework. One of the two “assignments” was the 500+ page dissertation by DAVID L. PRENTICE, “ENDING AMERICA’S VIETNAM WAR: Vietnamization’s Domestic Origins and International Ramifications, 1968-1970.” A few paragraphs from that study is quoted here to highlight the activities of the president and Dr. Kissinger during the period before, during and subsequent to the month of September 1969. DUCK HOOK came and went… I quote from pages 386-388 of the Prentice paper…
Chapter 10. A VERY NEAR THING…
“There’s a lot to be said for winning.”… Henry Kissinger, October 2, 1969
“(Nixon) thought that he could ride it out and, of course, Henry was always pushing him one way and I was pushing him the other way.”… Melvin Laird…
“The debate over de-Americanization and escalation had long occupied Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and Melvin Laird, but matters came to a head during the fall of 1969. In the 1950s and 1960s, all three had defended American intervention in Indochina as necessary to defeat and deter Communist advance. All three had built their political careers on the conflict there. And all three had advocated some combination of indigenous self-defense and an all-out U.S. air and naval assault against North Vietnam. In 1968, Nixon and Kissinger dropped their military rhetoric and reluctantly accepted some withdrawals as a political necessity. Laird, on the other hand, understood that public support for the war had fundamentally changed; only progressive de-Americanization could achieve allied objectives in South Vietnam. Even President Lyndon Johnson had grappled with the choice between de-Americanizing the war or resuming and expanding the bombardment of North Vietnam but he left the decision to his successor. Aside from abandoning the Republic of Vietnam, American policymakers pared their alternatives down to a stark choice between Vietnamization or escalation.
“Looking back, Henry Kissinger claimed that he ‘never examined [escalation] more than halfheartedly,’ but that was untrue. Before Nixon’s inauguration, Kissinger had developed a plan to threaten Hanoi with unprecedented violence, which Nixon would make good on if the North Vietnamese did not begin to settle the war in earnest. Believing that domestic circumstances would not afford them the time necessary to implement a successful Vietnamese strategy, Kissinger consistently pushed the president to reconsider escalation. With Nixon’s assent, Kissinger proceeded with this plan. In 1969, the White House intensified the war in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos; indirectly and directly threatened further escalation; established the November 1 ultimatum for serious talks; drew up contingency plans; and delayed American withdrawals. Kissinger knew that Nixon had yoked his credibility as a decisive statement (or mad president) on the ultimatum. Kissinger and Nixon had this one opportunity to get it right and ‘go for broke’ in Vietnam. By September 1, everything was in place except the final attack plan and presidential authorization.
“Escalation remained contingent on internal circumstances, though. Reporting the pair’s ‘rather more hawkish tack,’ one British offical noted that ‘domestic American pressures, at the moment relatively quiescent, are likely to be the major factor in deciding whether or not the new policy will be viable. This in turn will be dependent not only on events in Vietnam but also on the course of events in the United States.’ In late August, Haldeman reviewed Kissinger’s plan and predicted there would ‘be a tough period ahead if we go for it.’ Indeed, Congress increasingly scrutinized the Vietnam War and antiwar forces were busy preparing for an October 15 moratorium to show that the vocal minority of anti-warriors was actually a majority. On June 30, the former head of Youth for McCarthy, Sam Brown, announced, ‘We want to make it clear that the 2 percent that people talk about on the campuses are really 70 percent–that they’re not just ‘crazy radicals’ but ‘your sons and daughters’.’
“Attuned to this domestic sentiment, Laird defended his Vietnamization program from Kissinger’s attacks that fall. Congressional antipathy and antiwar protests lent credence to Laird’s arguments against Kissinger’s escalation plan, Duck Hook. Whereas Duck Hook would unleash violent unrest, congressional inquiries, and perhaps decisive cuts to war appropriations, Laird reasoned that Vietnamization would prolong public support while providing the best chance of securing victory in South Vietnam.
“As a result of Laird’s faith in Vietnamization and events that fall, Nixon broke away from escalation. What appeared so attractive in September lost its luster in October. Laird’s criticism gave Nixon no good reason to reevaluate Kissinger’s proposal. The Joint Chiefs’ skepticism of the campaign’s military effectiveness added more clout to Laird’s argument. Meanwhile, the moratorium reminded Nixon that the American public would not be tolerant towards an expanded conflict, especially when Hanoi appeared to be reducing the ground war’s intensity. Nixon later wrote, ‘[After these events,] I began to think more in terms of stepping up Vietnamization while continuing the fighting at its present level rather than of trying to increase it.’ Nixon rejected using the ultimatum as a pretext for an air and naval assault against North Vietnam. Instead of becoming a viable alternative to Vietnamization, Duck Hook became just another contingency plan.”… End quote…
The next time DUCK HOOK, the contingency plan to get North Vietnam’s attention, would get a look, it would be 1972, and with a few tweaks, would be called LINEBACKER I and II…
AND THEN THERE IS THIS: Snipped from the April, 1954 report from Vietnam by Graham Greene:
“So the war goes drearily on its way with local successes ignored in the Paris press and local defeats magnified into disasters. Dien-Bien-Phu takes the pace of Na-Sam in the news : 1953 attack at Luang Prabang is repeated in 1954 and stops again within a few miles of the Laotian capital. Lunching at Nam Dinh and eating an excellent souffle I was asked by the general commanding whether I had ever had so good a souffle before to the sound of gunfire. I could have replied that I had–two years before, at the same table, to the sound of the same guns.
“Everybody knows now on both sides that the fate of Viet-Nam does not rest with the armies. It would be hard for either army to lose the war, and certainly neither can win it. However much material the Americans and Chinese pour in, they can only keep the pot hot, they will never make it boil. Two years ago men believed in the possibility of military defeat or victory; now they know the war will be decided elsewhere by men who have never waded waist-deep in fields of paddy, struggled up mountain sides, been involved in the middle of attack or the long boredom of waiting.”…
https://newrepublic.com/article/119243/graham-greene-reports-vietnam-war-vietnam
Next post: “FIFTY YEARS AGO–Remembering A Month of the Vietnam War: October 1969″…
Lest we forget… Bear
