Bear Taylor 
RIPPLE SALVO… #736… THE HISTORIC SIEGE OF KHE SANH BEGAN ON 21 JANUARY 1968 AND ENDED 7 APRIL 1968. “It began in earnest with bad weather, the timely defection of an NVA lieutenant who disclosed the enemy’s initial battle plan, and a nip-and-tuck defense of the U.S. Marine outpost on Hill 861. It ended with good weather, a Marine push-out, and then the April 1 launching of Operation Pegasus, the lightly opposed relief expedition by the Marines and the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division.” What happened there? And Why?… (re: Peter Braestrup’s Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington)… … but first…
Good Morning: Day SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX of a return of fifty years to the Vietnam war and the men who fought it on the ground and in the air, especially the men who carried the war into the heartland of North Vietnam…the warriors of ROLLING THUNDER…
HEAD LINES from The New York Times on Monday, 11 March 1968…
GROUND WAR and KHE SANH: “NORTH VIETNAMESE SHELLS BATTER CHAIN OF U.S. POSTS–Stockpiles of Ammunition and Fuel Blown Up–Khe Sanh Hit Anew–Westmoreland Asserts Very Heavy Fighting Ahead”... “Heavy artillery fire from North Vietnam yesterday pounded the American Naval base at Cua Viet, an estuary leading to Dongha, in northern South Vietnam…although American casualties were light, the base had received heavy damage. The base is about seven miles south of the Benhai River, the border between North and South Vietnam. Tons of Ammunition and fuel at the base were destroyed when a mortar shell touched off numerous explosives…other enemy shells and rockets hit the big American base at Danang, where a fire was destroying stores of gasoline… Khe Sanh received more than 250 rounds of fire on Saturday–casualties were described as light…The American command said that paratroopers of the 101st Airborne Division killed 35 North Vietnamese in an all-day battle five miles northwest of Hue on Saturday. American losses were put at 3 men killed and 21 wounded… General William C. Westmoreland said today that there would be ‘very, very heavy fighting’ in the northern provinces of South Vietnam in the weeks and months ahead…. It is the enemy’s intent to dominate the military force of these two provinces…He has failed to date, but he has not given up. I expect him to continue these efforts… At a briefing in Saigon the new table of organization was announced and described for the press. It was announced that tactical air operations in the I Corps area would be supervised by General William W. Momyer, the Deputy Commander for Air Operations at General Westmoreland’s headquarters and the commander of the Seventh Air Force (Blue Chip). General Momyer will coordinate all the strikes of the Air Force, marine air wing, and, to a limited extent, the Navy fighters in the Gulf of Tonkin. It is understood on good authority that Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, the commander in Chief of American Forces in the Pacific refused to place the carrier striking force fully under the joint command in South Vietnam, but agreed to informal cooperation. Major General Walter Kerwin, chief of staff of the United States command, explained that the great concentration of air strikes in the northern provinces, particularly around Khe Sanh and elsewhere along the demilitarized zone had made closer coordination necessary.
Page 1: “ROCKEFELLER URGED BY G.O.P. LEADERS TO GET INTO THE RACE–But He Tells Meeting Here He First Wants To Consult Others In Next Few Days–Conservatives Attend”… “New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller was strongly urged yesterday at a meeting of Republican party leaders, most of them moderates, to get into the Presidential race ‘as an announced and active candidate.’…he must decide by March 22 to enter the Oregon primary May 28.”… Page 1: “NIXON WITHHOLDS HIS PEACE IDEAS–Says to Tell Details of Plan Would Sap His Bargaining Position if He’s Elected”... “…will stand firm on his pledge that a new Administration would ‘end the war’ in Vietnam but he continue to resist pressure from friends and critics alike to explain in detail how he or any other Republican President could achieve that objective.”... Page 1: “RUSK WILL FACE HIS SENATE CRITICS ON VIETNAM TODAY”...”…in a long-awaited public confrontation just as the Administration is reviewing a set of basic questions about the future of the war effort.”… Page 24: “Eisenhower and Reagan Meet in California”… Page 1: “MOSCOW IS SILENT ON UNREST IN BLOC—Events in Warsaw, Prague and Bucharest Are Ignored.”… “Silence persisted in the Soviet Union today over the most turbulent development in Eastern Europe since the Hungarian uprising in 1956.”… Page 1: “U.S. WINS BACKING FROM GOLD POOL TO HOLD $35 PRICE–6 WEST EUROPEAN MEMBERS READY TO CONTINUE LOSING GOLD STOCKS TO SPECULATORS”…
11 March 1968…The President’s Daily Brief… LAOS: The Communists have overrun vital portions of the important guerrilla base at Phou Pha Thi (The rest of this briefing item remains classified and has been redacted…interestingly, the rest of this story is available below thanks to Howie Plunkett’s research…good story) SOUTH VIETNAM: A new anti-Communist popular front was formally launched in Saigon. Some 2,000 delegates were present, representing a broad spectrum of the country’s political and religious groups…. NORTH VIETNAM: Medical Problems. A senior Swedish Red Cross official has told the US mission in Geneva that the Russian Red Cross has asked for urgent and large shipments of first aid kits, medicine , medical supplies and textiles for clothing to North Vietnam. A Russian Red Cross official was quoted as saying that there had been a breakdown both in hospital systems and medical treatment in North Vietnam…
STATE DEPARTMENT, Office of Historian, Historical Documents, Foreign Relations, 1964-658 Vietnam, Vol. 6: Three documents dated 11 March 1968. Document 118 is an interesting “Information Memorandum” from the Vatican to the White House via a super sensitive back channel that proposes a way to get peace talks going… a lesson in how statecraft is conducted… Document 119 is a memo from CJCS Wheeler to the President relaying some ideas put forth in conversation between former Ambassador to South Vietnam Lodge and General Wheeler. Not very interesting. Document 120 is a short memo from the CJCS Wheeler to the President with the final recommendation on troop levels (30,000)... Read at:
118. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d118
119. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d119
120. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d120
11 March 1968… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER…New York Times (12 Mar reporting 11 Mar ops) Page 1: “The United States continued its air operations over North Vietnam reporting 76 missions flown. Pilots from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin reported destroying the Banthach power plant and bombing the Haiphong highway bridge, the Baithoung airfield and a railroad bridge between Hanoi and Haiphong. The Thainguyen rail yard and radar sites north of Hanoi were bombed by Air Force pilots, who also struck storage areas in the southern panhandle of North Vietnam.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses”(Chris Hobson) There were five fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 11 March 1968…
(1) An EC-47P of the 361st TEWS and 460th TRW out of Nha Trang was executing a mission over Southern Laos at 9,500 about 45 miles west of Kham Duc when hit by 37mm ground fire. An onboard fire, hydraulic system failure, a port engine failure and inadvertent extension of the landing gear followed. The aircraft commander LCOL ROBERT E. DOBYNS managed to keep the aircraft flying long enough to crash-land it at the Ben Het Special forces Camp close to the borders of Laos, South Vietnam and Cambodia meet. All six in the crew walked way to fly and fight another day. LCOL DOBYNS was awarded the Silver Star for his extraordinary heroism and airmanship… oohrah… and who was that O-2 FAC that joined and assisted the 47 into a favorable crash landing site??
(2) MAJOR ERNEST ARTHUR OLDS and 1LT ALBERT EDUARDO RODRIGUEZ were flying an F-4D of the 480th TFS and 366th TFW out of Danang on an armed reconnaissance mission along Route 1A in Route Package 2 near Cape Mui Ron when hit by ground fire while attacking vehicles on the roadway. There was no apparent attempt or time to eject and both warriors were killed in action that day fifty years ago. The remains of both MAJOR OLDS and 1LT RODRIGUEZ were returned to the United States in 1989… They are remembered on this 50th anniversary of their last flight with admiration and appreciation for their sacrifice for out country…
(3) MAJOR RONALD DALE BOND was flying an A-37A Dragonfly of the 604th ACS and 3rd TFW out of Bien Hoa and providing close air support for a ground unit and making strafing runs on the Vietcong when hit by enemy ground fire. There was no apparent attempt to eject. Tragically, fifty years after his death in combat in the service of his country his body remains where it fell… MAJOR BOND has been left behind…??? Why?…
(4) An A-1E of the 1st ACS and 56th ACW out of Nakhon Phanom on an armed reconnaissance mission and suffered an engine failure, not due to combat. The pilot walked away from the crash…
(5) An F-105D of the 357th TFS and 355th TFW out of Takhli suffered an engine oil pressure loss and eventual engine failure. He ejected and was rescued near Takhli…
FROM THE COMPILATION: “34TFS/F-105 History” of Howie Plunkett: 11-Mar-68 “F-105s from the 355th TFW and the 388th TFW had to discontinue ‘Commando Club’ radar-guided missions over North Vietnam and Laos when the radar site in Laos was overrun by enemy forces. After restrictions on flying into high-threat areas of North Vietnam were placed on the Ryan’s Raider F-105F aircraft in the summer of 1967, this was a second major blow to PACAF’s efforts in striking targets during bad weather over North Vietnam. In the early morning hours of 11 March 68, a sapper unit of 27 North Vietnamese soldiers, led by LT Truong Muc, attacked LS-85, the location of the TSQ-81 radar on top of Phon Pha Thi mountain northeastern Laos. The attack killed eleven of the ‘Heavy Green’ technicians who operated the site. the site had guided F-105s over targets in North Vietnam for only 18 weeks and had been the primary means of conducting air strikes during bad weather. The site’s destruction also knocked out its Channel 97 TACAN signals. the 354th TFS at Takhli was one of the F-105 squadrons effected by the loss of this radar site. ‘During the first portion of the month before the loss of this valuable site, many Commando Club missions were flown in northern Laos in support of the Royal Laotian forces (Which were under heavy attack from the North Vietnamese). Afterwards, the weather forced 354th pilots to restrict their attacks to targets in Laos and the lower route packages of North Vietnam.
“In one of the last Commando Club missions flown, F-105s from the 388th TFW struck Yen Bai airfield using Commando Club signals.
“Between 1 January and 11 March 1968, the 388th TFW flew 109 Commando Club missions using a total of 430 aircraft sorties. Of the missions, 104 were considered successful. A total of 860 tons of ordnance was expended and one aircraft was lost (on 4 Feb).”
From “The Journal of Military History, January 2002, page 199: “The Air Force never took full advantage of Commando Club strike…(on 18) November (1967) and because the growing threat of a ground attack on the radar site diverted bombing missions to the defense of the site, between 1 December 1967 and 11 March 1968, only three hundred Commando Club strike sorties were flown against North Vietnam.” By Merle L Pribbenow II in an article: “The -Ology War: Technology and Ideology in the Vietnamese Defense of Hanoi.”
11-Mar-68: Humble Host flew #118 flight of two to Steel Tiger to work with a Nails FAC. 5×2 MK-82s on a truck park under trees… No BDA…
RIPPLE SALVO… #735… WHAT HAPPENED AT KHE SANH and WHY WERE WE THERE??? From Peter Braestrup’s Big Story, pages 158-59… I quote…
“The January 21-April 7, 1968, siege of Khe Sanh began in earnest in bad weather, the timely defection of an NVA lieutenant who disclosed the enemy’s initial plan, and a nip-and-tuck defense of the Marine outpost on Hill 861. It ended with good weather, a Marine push-out, and the April 1 launching of Operation Pegasus, the lightly opposed relief expedition by the Marines and the US 1st Cavalry Division.
“Using light Soviet-built PT-76 tanks the NVA assaulted and took the isolated Lang Vei Special Forces camp on the Laotian border (manned by 24 Americans and 500 Montagnards) near Khe Sanh on February 7. By U.S. estimates, the enemy’s encircling divisions fired a daily average of some 150 rockets, mortar shells, and artillery rounds at the base and its surrounding hill outposts. He made three major assaults against these outposts and one abortive push against probes, began to back off in early March, under unprecedented U.S. air bombardment.
“Marine casualties at Khe Sanh (Operation Scotland) totaled 205 KIA and 852 wounded (evacuated) from November 1, 1967, to March 31, 1968, with 65 dead in March alone. Even if one assumes all these casualties occurred during the 77-day siege period, they came, on the average, to three killed per day and 12 wounded–considerably fewer losses than comparable U.S. 6,000-man units suffered else where during the same period. And both the flow of replacements and evacuation of casualties continued throughout the siege.
“Aircraft losses were minor. A total of four U.S. transport fixed-wing planes were destroyed on the ground or shot down: Three twin-engine C-123 Providers and one four-engine C-130s Hercules (in contrast to 62 aircraft lost by the French at Dienbienphu). A spotter plane and two fighter aircraft (an F-4 and an A-4) were shot down. The exact U.S. helicopter loss at Khe Sanh is elusive, but one Marine historian put the toll at 17, with perhaps twice the number receiving serious battle damage.
“All these figures, except the total helicopter losses, were either published in MACV communique or available to newsmen during the siege.
“The Marines were to claim 1,602 enemy bodies along the perimeter, but the figure obviously did not reflect any NVA losses suffered from the 100,000 tons of bombs dropped and the 158,000 rounds expended by marine artillery (nor did it take into account losses from shells fired by the Army’s long-range 175mm guns from Camp Carroll). Westmoreland was later to estimate total enemy losses of 10,000 to 15,000 killed, but this was accepted, at best, as no more than a guess. Nevertheless, most newsmen were ready, after a tour of the bomb-cratered moonscape around Khe Sanh following the siege to concede that the foe suffered more agony than had either Khe Sanh’s defenders or visiting newsmen.”
WHY WAS KHE SAHN IMPORTANT?
“The Administration did not add to the public understanding of the battle (or the importance of the site). Because of White House political worries, legitimate security concerns, and verbal sloppiness, the official U.S. rationals for defending Khe Sanh was never spelled out convincingly during the Tet period.”
Why? Westmoreland and Lieutenant General Cushman explained their reasons for choosing to hold a static as well as strategic position at Khe Sanh: (1) “in January 1968 the Marines lacked sufficient helicopters–and sufficiently good weather–to conduct a ‘mobile’ defense of the Khe Sanh gap in the Annamite Mountains( tactics later adopted); (2) it was preferable to try to tie up–and decimated with B-52 strikes–a major enemy force far from the populated coast; (3) the effectiveness of the systematic use of massive air power and electronic sensors to frustrate the enemy attack had been demonstrated in the defense of smaller exposed outpost at Conthien the previous autumn; and, (4) Khe Sanh appeared important to the enemy according to captured or defecting NVA officers, and hence should, as with air power and a fairly small (four battalion) U.S. ground commitment i could, be denied to him. Whatever their merits, these arguments were not advanced early in public, apparently for military security reasons.
“Thus, the ‘why’ of Khe Sanh remaining cloudy to laymen, including the President and newsmen, the door was opened to speculation.” End quote…
Humble Host thinks George Patton would have explained Khe Sanh this way. “It was the high ground on the strategic and historic invasion route. It was vital for the defense against enemy entry to the northern provinces and it was the essential “jumping off point” for going forward to cut the Ho Chi Minh life line for the war in the south. And for the three months of the siege the Marines holding the Khe Sanh strong point were “holding the enemy by the nose, while the air forces were kicking his arse.”… It was classic Patton…
RTR Quote for 11 March: HELMUTH VON MOLTKE: “A clever military leader will succeed in many cases in choosing defensive positions of such an offensive nature from the strategic point of view that the enemy is compelled to attack us in them.”…
Lest we forget… Bear
