Bear Taylor 
RIPPLE SALVO… #803… COLONEL JAMES HAGERSTROM, Director of Air Control Systems at Udorn in 1968… “If we don’t get it done here,”– interdict the flow of men and material down the Ho Chi Minh Trail– “we’re never going to succeed.” (Win!)… COL. HAGERSTROM: “Once the supplies get out of the (supply) arteries and into the capillaries, it becomes impossible to get them. And as long as you have X amount of air power to apply, you ought to apply that airpower at the point where you get the greater return– right adjacent to where the mountain passes come in from North Vietnam.” The Colonel was making a pitch for more sorties in and about Mu Gia and Nape Passes…. This, of course, was the same argument –“hit’em in the arteries, not the capillaries”– for choking off the enemy supply lines at the Chinese border and the docks at Haiphong. Who among us didn’t see deckloads of roadgraders and vehicles in bunches awaiting off-load in Haiphong that we would later have to hang it out to find in onesies and twosies in the jungles?– It was like looking for a praying mantis in a hedge. With the President’s 31 March edict to limit the bombing to 19-degrees North and below, the war became one of limited interdiction–therefore, Advantage: North Vietnam… but first…
GOOD MORNING…Day EIGHT HUNDRED THREE of a remembrance of a war in the air fought fifty years ago when we were young…
HEAD LINES from THE NEW YORK TIMES on a gloomy Friday, 17 May 1968…
THE WAR: Page 1: “U.S. WAR DEAD 562, MOST IN ANY WEEK–WOUNDS HOSPITALIZE 1,153–TOTAL OF ENEMY KILLED IN PERIOD LISTED AT 5,552″… “The military command reported today that 562 Americans died in South Vietnam during the week that ended last Saturday. It was the highest American death toll for any week of the war. A spokesman said that the figure reflected not so much the heavy fighting in and around Saigon as a series of battles in the I Corps area, comprising South Vietnam’s five northernmost provinces. During the same week, 1,153 servicemen were wounded seriously enough to require hospitalization. An additional 1,072 were wounded, but did not require hospital treatment. The newest fatalities brought to 22,951 the total American dead in the South Vietnam fighting since January 1, 1961. The previous record for American fatalities came during the Luna New Year offensive, in the week ended February 17, when 543 United States soldiers died. In announcing the American casualties for the latest week, the military command also said that 5,552 enemy soldiers had been killed in the same period. This was the fifth highest death toll for North Vietnamese and Vietcong soldiers in a single week of the war… The military spokesman said that about 260 American soldiers had been killed during the week in the I Corps area. He said that some of these fatalities occurred during the preceding week in the I Corps area but were carried on the current list because of difficulty in notifying the next of kin.
MOST DIED NEAR DONGHA… where American Marines were fighting against a division of the North Vietnamese Army. In the first days of the fighting near the village of Daido the Marines lost most of a battalion–generally a battalion numbers about 700 men–although they listed their losses as moderate. During the fight for the village, one company was commanded by a low-ranking enlisted man because the officers had been wiped out…. In action today, United States Marines killed at least 131 enemy soldiers in heavy fighting south of Danang. The marines, who fought with the support of artillery, helicopter gunships and jet fighter-bombers, suffered 28 killed and 37 wounded.
BATTLE NEAR SAIGON… In another battle 18 miles northwest of Saigon, 82 enemy soldiers were said to have been killed in a nine-hour fight with American infantrymen. Five soldiers from the United States 25th Infantry Division were killed…In the Mekong Delta elements of the Second Brigade of the Ninth Infantry Division were said to have killed 49 enemy soldiers in a five hour clash near Mytho. Six Americans were killed…Near Khe Sanh, marines from the Third Division were reported to have killed 46 North Vietnamese while losing seven Marines.”…
PEACE TALKS: Page 1: “HARRIMAN ‘SMOKESCREEN’ SEEN BY NORTH VIETNAMESE”… “The North Vietnamese today dismissed as a smokescreen American Ambassador W. Averell Harriman’s statement that he had found areas of possible agreement between the two sides in the peace talks. ‘It is a matter of words, not substance,’ Nguyen Van Sao, a spokesman for the Hanoi delegation told reporters. He added that Mr. Harriman, the head of the United States delegation, had produced only ‘apparent similarities,’ nothing real. Yesterday n the second substantive session of the ‘official conversations,’ as the talks are called. Mr. Harriman said that he had been ‘struck by some similarities in our respective positions’ when he had gone over the opening statement by Xuan Thuy, the chief delegate from Hanoi…. Sources close to the Hanoi delegation said today that no one should expect movement on substance in the talks. One source suggested that the propaganda battle would go on as is for at least a month. It seems clear that while the North Vietnamese talk and broadcast their views through the press, their attention is concentrated very heavily on what is actually happening in south Vietnam–militarily nd politically …The North Vietnamese appear prepared, therefore, to talk on without betraying any sign of impatience. The American delegation is adopting the same long haul outlook. ‘We are now involved in a major propaganda campaign,’ Mr. Harriman told a reporter.”…
Page 20: “KENNEDY ATTACKS HUMPHREY BASE– HITS ‘POLITICS OF HAPPINESS’… Page 20: “HUMPHREY SHRUGS AT KENNEDY VICTORY–GIBES AT ROCKEFELLER”… Page 22: “NIXON BIDS COLUMBIA U. OUST ANARCHIST STUDENTS”… Page 26: “Reagan Proposes Judicial Reform–He Ask’s Changes To Stiffen Enforcement of Law”… Page 26: “Gallup Says Young Voters Shift–Kennedy is Down, Humphrey Is Up”… Page 28 “The Poor Move On Toward The Capital–A Rally In Washington Attracts About 5,000″… Page 28. “Police Head In Capital Ddefends Shooting To Bar Arson In Riots”… Page 28: “Ralph Abernathy And 72 Congressmen Confer On Poor People’s Goals”… Page 8: “Eisenhower Makes Good Progress In Walter Reed Army Hospital”…
17 MAY 1968…OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (18 May reporting 17 May ops) Page 1: “In the air war over the southern part of North Vietnam, United States Navy pilots were said to have destroyed a MIG-17 on the ground a mile north of the airfield in Vinh. A Navy spokesman said that the Soviet-built fighter was discovered when an air strike tore camouflage away from the tail section. Other aircraft then destroyed the MIG. Observers here were puzzled by the disclosure, since the military has consistently maintained that the airfield at Vinh was not operational for jets, because of tis short runway and because the field has been heavily bombed almost daily for the last two months.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There were three fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 17 May 1968…
(1) CAPTAIN J.T. MATTOX was flying an F-100D of the 416th TFS an 37th TFW out of Phu Cat and on his third attack on Vietcong five miles from Phu Cat he was gunned down by ground fire. He ejected and came down within sight of his homefield and was picked up by a Phu Cat based HH-43 to fly and fight again… and again…
(2) MAJOR WILBUR A. SKAAR was flying an O-1F Bird Dog of the 21st TASS and 504th TASG controlling air strikes on an enemy automatic weapons site 15 miles west of Kontum when hit by ground fire. The damage was catastrophic and MAJOR SKAAR was unable to abandon the aircraft before ground impact. The Major’s body was recovered and he is buried in the Black Hills National Cemetery…He is remembered here on the 50th anniversary of his last flight in the service of our country… Gone but not forgotten…
(3) MAJOR R.W. WARDLAW was flying an A-4E of the VMA-311 Tomcats and MAG-12 out of Chu Lai in a flight of four striking enemy troops about seven miles north of Khe Sanh when hit with small arms fire. He ejected in the contested area and was rescued post-haste to fly and fight agin…
Humble Host flew #166 and #167 with a third flight between. #166 was a night dive bombing mission to Steel Tiger to work with the flare ship. Put 6 Mk-82s on a road somewhere in Laos. Wingman unable to get his ordnance to release so diverted to Danang, again. On deck long enough to dearm and fuel up for return to Enterprise. Took off in the dark and recovered at dawn. Quick nap and back in the air for #167. Logbook says 1.9 flight hours with 4 Mk-82s dropped on a bridge on Hiway 15 in Happy Valley… Must have been dragging–short on notes on this one…
RIPPLE SALVO… #803… THE VIETNAM WAR WAS A WAR OF ATTRITION… The job of United States air forces was to attrite the enemy’s men and material before it could reach the battlefields of South Vietnam. By all accounts, we did a lousy job. Humble Host did a little digging today to support that conclusion… Two books, about 600 pages of the history of our interdiction operations in Laos, are recommended for your perusal: (1) Jacob Van Staavenen’s Interdiction in Southern Laos, 1961-1968 and (2) Bernard Nalty’s The War Against Trucks: Aerial Interdiction of Southern Laos. I quote from Staavenen’s Epilogue…
“The scope and intensity of the Tet offensive, which would continue through February, would profoundly affect American military and diplomatic policy toward Hanoi. The offensive underscored the communist’s tenacity and resilience, and cast severe doubt on official estimates of their manpower and supply losses in the war theater. As the narrative has indicated, nowhere was it more difficult to calculate those losses than in Laos. Some assessment of bomb damage was possible by daily aerial and ground reconnaissance. But for the overwhelming number of air strikes against fixed and armed reconnaissance targets, intelligence analysts were forced to assess strike results, chiefly on evidence gleaned from fleeting pilot observations, and on extrapolations from thousands of secondary fires and explosions.
“North Vietnam’s infiltration through Laos had of course been aided and abetted in several ways. There was the generosity of its communist suppliers, particularly the Soviet Union and China. More significant was the impact of political considerations on military policy. One major concern was the desire to preserve,if possible, the Geneva Agreement of 1962 on the neutrality of Laos. More important was the danger of possible confrontation with the Soviets and Chinese. Consequently, the president would not allow the Air Force and Navy to impose an effective air and naval blockade of the North. Important targets were immune from air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area (including the Haiphong port), and in the twenty-five to thirty-nautical mile buffer zone next to China. This permitted an uninterrupted flow of military supplies to enter the North by ship, rfail and road.
“Once freely unloaded in the country, the supplies were quickly dispersed. This made it more difficult for American pilots to find and destroy them, not only in the North but along the rudimentary transportation system in Laos.
“In Laos the jungle and mountainous terrain, the monsoon weather, and the smoke and haze were Hanoi’s natural allies. The North Vietnamese also adeptly kept infiltration routes open by such tactics as night traveling, camouflaging, road and trail building and repairing, and by emplacing their most lethal antiaircraft defenses at or along key infiltration points. By 1968 they had transformed the 200-mile-long southeastern Laos corridor (known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail) into hundreds of miles of fair-weather motorable roads, and an intricate maze of smaller roads, trails, paths, bridges, supply sites, truck parks, rest areas and overnight shelters. The roads, trails and paths were linked with stream and river transportation systems. Together they assured a steady flow of supplies into South Vietnam or areas adjacent to its borders.
“Finally, Air Force and other service pilots were enjoined to abide by many and frequently changing air rules emanating from Washington or Vientiane officials. The rules prohibited tactical and B-52 strikes on ffiendly towns and villages, troops, roadwatch teams, and on specified routes and waterways in the demilitarized zone and neutral Cambodia, all for the prurose of preserving the fragile Geneva agreements of 1962 on Laos’s neutrality. Thus were the North Vietnamese able to blunt the impact of a series of progressively heavier, albeit limited, air and air-ground infiltration programs in Southern Laos.
“The psychological effect of the Tet offensive on a war-weary Washington and the nation was dramatic. It impelled the administration to alter its war strategy and undertake a more determined effort to find peace. In the ensuing weeks, it ended the bombing of most of North Vietnam and began initial ‘talks’ with Hanoi’s leaders on a settlement. These were developments that lessened considerably the fear of triggering a wider war and rupturing fatally the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos. Later, however, the air war against infiltration in Southern Laos would intensify, less encumbered by the manifold limited air programs and operational restrictions of previous years.”… End quote…
The appendices of the Staavenen book provide pertinent data from the Laos interdiction campaign from 1964 through 1967. The Nalty book picks up the Laos story and the numbers from there. Humble Host will return to the subject when a good source for the Rolling Thunder –North Vietnam– interdiction campaign of 1 April to 1 November 1968 is inhand…
RTR quote for 17 May” COL JAMES HAGERSTROM: “Once the supplies get out of the arteries and into the capillaries, it becomes impossible to get them.”…
Lest we forget… Bear
