RIPPLE SALVO… #746… WISE MEN FRONT AND CENTER… Dean Acheson, George Ball, McGeorge Bundy, General Omar Bradley, Patrick Dean, Douglas Dillon, Henry Cabot Lodge, Robert Murphy, General Maxwell Taylor, Arthur Goldberg, Cyrus Vance, and General Matthew Ridgway. These trusted advisors, along with Secretary Clifford, Dean Rusk, Richard Helms, General Earle Wheeler, and Walt Rostow, met with the President in the White House on 26 March 1968 and endorsed , ‘despite misgivings,’ the modified Rolling Thunder plan the President presented to the nation in his 31 March speech that shook up the world… but first…
GOOD MORNING: Day SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY-SIX on a stroll through the years of the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign, including 1968, “the year the dream died.”….
HEAD LINES from The New York Times on a cloudy Thursday, 21 March 1968: 50 years ago this day…
THE GROUND WAR & KHE SANH: Page 13: “SAIGON AIR BASE SHELLED BY FOE–15 ROUNDS DO LIGHT DAMAGE IN FACE OF ALLIED SWEEP”... “Enemy troops shelled the Tansonnhut Air Base on the edge of Saigon early this morning. The first such attack in three weeks, it came in the face of an allied offensive aimed at driving the Vietcong and North Vietnamese troops from the paddies and palm groves ringing the South Vietnamese capital… The fighting yesterday in the 50,000 trooper allied sweep around Saigon brought the United States losses in the operation to 35 killed and 308 wounded. The enemy so far has lost 1,070 killed…. There was little activity at the Marine outpost of Khe Sanh in the northwestern corner of “South Vietnam where North Vietnamese regulars with an advantage of more than three to one in manpower are poised to attack…. Some 360 miles northeast of Saigon American troops reported having sunk 13 enemy sampans and killing 22 men aboard. There were no American casualties.”... Page 1: “WESTMORELAND SEES BIG GAINS IN ’68–29 Days Before Tet Attacks, He Defined U.S.Goals–Did not Expect Offensive”... “In a year-end report submitted 29 days before the Communist offensive against South Vietnam cities and major towns, General William C. Westmoreland predicted that the allied war gains of last year would be increased manyfold in 1968. The American military commander in South Vietnam sent his report to Washington January 1. Excerpts from the classified document have been obtained the New York Times. They make clear that not only was the offensive unexpected but that also Untied States military planning did not envision the possibility of a setback on the scale of that inflicted by the enemy attacks at Tet…
Page 1: “JOHNSON AGENT IN NEW YORK STATE INITIATES DRIVE ON KENNEDY–Tells Leader’s Party Will Mount ‘Vigorous’ Campaign For President–Sharp Attack On Party Boss For Support of Kennedy”… Page 1:”Kennedy Disputes Housing Air Bill–Criticizes President’s Plan And Presses His Own At Packed Senate Hearing”…Page 36: “JOHNSON COUNTER ATTACKS–hIS SPEECHES ON VIETNAM POLICY MARK SWIFT RESPONSE TO POLITICAL CHALLENGES”… Page 37: “Rockefeller Assails Silence On Riot Report–Reaction On Some Questions Called Strange”… Page 28: “Eisenhower Tells Of Ideal Candidate”… Page 1: “Truman Forecasts A Johnson Victory Despite Party rift”… “Rockefeller Tell His Plans Today–Party Leaders Say He May Bar An All-Out Campaign”… Page 15: “Roger Hilsman Bids U.S. De-Escalate War–Ex-Rusk Aide Would De-Americanize The Conflict”…
Page 5: “JOHNSON TELLS OF ‘PHONY PEACE'”... “President Johnson said tonight that a ‘quick peace, an ‘easy peace’ in Vietnam was ‘not necessarily a just and honest peace.’ Toasting General Alfredo Stroessner, the President of Paraguay, Mr. Johnson said that ‘frequently you can lose more lives with a phony peace than a just one.‘ In an unprecedented gesture at a state dinner at the White House, Mr. Johnson followed his toast with another special toast in honor of a posthumous Medal of Honor winner whose parents were special guests at the dinner. The toast was in honor of Second Lieutenant Robert Hibbs of Cedar falls, Iowa, who was awarded the nation’s highest award for valor on January 26, 1967, for heroism in Vietnam…
21 MARCH 1968…THE PRESIDENT’S DAILY BRIEF (CIA/TS)…ISRAEL/JORDAN; Late Item: Information as of 0400 EST indicates that fighting is still going on north of the Dead Sea, where the Jordanians apparently are resisting strongly….The Israelis moved into Jordan early today. Their troops, supported by tanks, crossed the cease-fire line at several points. There were at least two helicopter-borne incursions, and Israeli fighters have been supporting missions. Tel Aviv claims its aim is to wipe out terrorist bases near the cease-fire line, and it says that once this has been accomplished, its troops will return home. Even if they do, the Israeli action has made King Husayn’s position even more tenuous that it was before… CUBA: In a series of austerity measures last week, Castro decreed the expropriation of all remaining private businesses, closed all bars and cabarets, and suspended the national lottery…the bar closures may also be an effort to shut off criticism of the government. Castro earlier inveighed against “coffee-house pundits,” and he apparently doesn’t like ‘barroom philosophers’ either… NORTH VIETNAM: Hanoi Again Rejects San Antonio Formula...North Vietnam has issued another point-by-point rejection of the US position on a bombing halt and negotiations’ An article in the 11 March issue of the Hanoi weekly Vietnam Courier entitled “True Nature of Johnsonism” again sums up President Johnson’s San Antonio formula… HANOI ON KHE SANH: Hanoi is continuing to grind out propaganda commentaries characterizing the US position at Khe Sanh as all but hopeless. In a broadcast of 20 March, the “critical situation” at Khe Sanh was held up as a reflection of the over-all position of “defense and failure of the US in South Vietnam.” The broadcast listed a long series of strategic factors favorable to the communist forces in the area and noted that “like a punctured balloon” US officials have stopped “clamoring for defending Khe Sanh at all costs and have begun talking of withdrawal.”…
STATE DEPARTMENT, Office of Historian, Historical Documents, Foreign Relations, 1964-68, Vietnam: Document 148 is an information memorandum dated 21 March 1968 from LBJ’s Special Assistant Walt Rostow to the President that summarizes where Rostow sees the Vietnam war going over the next few months. He suggests some bold moves: mining Haiphong, invading North Vietnam, and pushing into Laos… LBJ must have grabbed a hand full of Rolaids to get through this short think piece… Read at:…
Document 148 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d148
21 MARCH 1968…OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER…New York Times (22 Mar reporting 21 mar ops)… Page 1: “U.S. PLANES PRESS STRIKES IN NORTH, BIGGEST IN MONTH–Improved Weather Permits Raids Near Haiphong and Hanoi and in Panhandle”… “United States planes, taking advantage of slightly improved weather, have carried out the heaviest attacks in more than a month. They bombed and strafed in the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong, North Vietnam’ main port, and ranged through the southern panhandle Wednesday (21st), damaging or destroying 130 trucks, 49 supply boats, 12 railroad cars and 2 surface-to-air missile sites. An Air Force F-100 crashed northwest of Donghoi, bringing the number of American aircraft lost in the north to 813. The pilot was reported missing….
“The air raids in North Vietnam totaled 119 multiple sortie missions, the highest since February 19. Air Force pilots flying F-4 Phantoms and F-105 Thunderchiefs struck at a 125-truck convoy on route 15A Happy Valley, north and east of the Mugia Pass, putting 65 of the vehicles out of action. The Mugia Pass is near the Laotian border in the lower panhandle region, the narrow, southern part of North Vietnamese supplies into South Vietnam. Between the coast cities of Vinh and Donghoi, Navy pilots battered 55 trucks that were believed to be en route with supplies to the enemy forces around the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh.
“‘The trucks were along a dirt road headed south,’ said one of the pilots, Commander James C. Hill, of Davis City, Iowa…. Air Force pilots reported having destroyed the radar system of surface-to-air missile sited 4 miles east of Hanoi and 10 miles to the North… Navy pilots attacked the Hongay power plant 27 miles east of Haiphong and sank 20 supply barges at the mouth of the river (Song Ca) near Thanh Hoa.”…
“Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There were two fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 21 March 1968…
(1) MAJOR JOHN A. HERBER, USMC, was flying an A-4E of the VMA-311 Tomcats and MAG-12 out of Chu Lai on a night radar drop on a target south of Danang and forced to eject, presumably due to engine failure. He was rescued to fly and fight again…
(2) 1LT PETER DEAN HESFORD and 1LT AUBREY EUGENE STOWERS were flying an F-4D of the 390th TFS and 366th TFW out of Danang in a night section strike in Steel Tiger working with a FAC near Ban Kapay. 1LT HERBER rolled in on a truck target behind his leader and was thought to have been hit by 37mm AAA. The aircraft was observed to crash into the face of a mountain. There was no ejection observed or beeper/radio heard. The FAC remained in the area for two hours, but neither heard or observed anything further from the two young pilots. They were listed as missing in action with the hope that they would return with repatriated prisoners in 1973, although prisoners held in Laos were not covered by the end of the war agreements with North Vietnam. The bodies of 1LT HESFORD and 1LT STOWERS have never been found and apparently remain where they fell on the battlefield 50 years ago this day… they are remembered with respect and appreciation for the capital sacrifice made for out country… they rest in peace, duty done
Humble Host also extends very highest respect and admiration to Arthur J. Hesford who worked tirelessly for decades to find his missing son… At one point, in about 1977, he appeared before a “select congressional committee” to hear the committee tell him that they could find no reason to believe his youngest son was still alive. Arthur Hesford refused to accept the judgement. “Unacceptable,” he said. “The committee didn’t prove he was dead. It just couldn’t prove he was alive. The finding was inept and the vigil of a man whose son was shot down over Laos nearly nine years ago continues. I will wait a lifetime for an accounting of my son.”
No man left behind?... An admirable goal, unfortunately, not always achievable ...Joint Recovery Team: if at first you don’t succeed, try again, and again…
RIPPLE SALVO… #746… MARCH MADNESS and “the big dance” in the Cabinet Room of the White House on Tuesday, 26 March 1968… From Edward Drea’s “McNamara, Clifford and the Burdens of Vietnam“… I quote… (Pages 224-5)…
“Before the Wise Men could reassemble on 26 March, however, the White House, State, and OSD again reevaluated the air campaign. By mid-March Wheeler believed the bombing north of 20 degrees could be stopped because poor flying weather through mid-April precluded hitting many targets anyway. He expected Hanoi’s response to be ‘tangible and measurable,’ that is a reciprocal curtailment of military action by North Vietnam and withdrawal of its reciprocal curtailment of military action by North Vietnam and withdrawal of its regular forces from the DMZ in exchange for the bombing concessions. It was then that Clifford realized and suggested that the objective should be: ‘(We) are not out to win the war–we are out to win the peace,’ to which the president replied, ‘That is right.’
“Around the same time Clifford again suggested that de-escalation begin with a ‘limited cessation’ of bombing north of the 20th parallel in expectation of reciprocal reaction by Hanoi in the vicinity of the DMZ. Rusk, while supportive, doubted Hanoi would reciprocate: William Bundy was skeptical but had no alternative to offer; Rostow thought Hanoi would see through the charade of proclaiming a bombing halt in bad weather when few attacks could occur anyway. On 23 March, Harry McPherson sent Johnson a memo supporting the thrust of the Clifford-Rusk proposal, suggesting that the president announce his willingness to stop all bombing if Hanoi reciprocated by not attacking South Vietnamese citizens or U.S. bases and not shelling south of the DMZ. Two days later Rusk told the president that he agreed with McPherson’s approach, adding that if Hanoi mounted major attacks full bombing should be resumed; meanwhile, bombing ‘should be intensive and without wraps’ in North Vietnam’s panhandle region.
“The president met with the Wise Men contingent on 26 March in the Cabinet Room. Some favored an immediate cessation of bombing, others a halt at some later point but immediately because of the dangerous situation in the I Corps area along the DMZ. The recommendation apparently influenced the president’s subsequent decision to restrict the bombing. On 29 March Clifford and Nitze informed the Joint chiefs that the president had decided to halt the bombing north of the 20th parallel in order to shore up crumbling domestic support for the war and force the North Vietnamese to make the next move. despite persisting misgivings about the effects of the pause, the chiefs agreed to support the decision.
“On 31 March Johnson publicly announced his order to air and naval forces to make no attacks on North Vietnam, except in an undefined area north of the DMZ. If North Vietnam matched this restraint, he continued, even that limited bombing could end. Attempting to mollify Sharp, once again caught ‘completely unaware’ of the major policy shift, Wheeler informed him that the duration of the bombing restrictions depended on North Vietnam’s reaction to the president’s peace offer. Johnson also told the nation that he would not seek reelection.”… End quote….
RTR Quote for 21 March: R.W. EMERSON: “The world belongs to the energetic.” Fred the Great would say: “The world belongs to the industrious smart.”…
Lest we forget… Bear