Bear Taylor 
RIPPLE SALVO… #734… In March 1968, about half-time in the Vietnam war, the Johnson Administration was engrossed in a “VIETNAM REASSESSMENT”…”The politico-strategic debate within the Administration over what to do next in Vietnam undoubtedly will lead the country deeper into disaster if it continues to focus on means rather than ends,” so said the New York Times in an OpEd on 4 March 1968. The Times input is below along with the Humble Host “solution”…but first…
GOOD MORNING… DAY SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR of a remembrance of a war fought to a stunning conclusion 50 years ago…
HEAD LINES from The New York Times on Saturday, 9 March 1968…
GROUND WAR and KHE SANH: Page 1: “164 OF FOE KILLED AT MARINE BASE–South Vietnamese Account For Most of Enemy Dead–U.S. Loses 16 Men”… “…allied troops killed 164 of the enemy in a clash two miles from the major American Marine headquarters and supply center at Dongha, in northern Quangtri Province…three miles north of Saigon’s Tansonnhut air base, United States infantrymen fought an enemy battalion yesterday. in two engagements two enemy soldiers were killed and two were captured. Two Americans were killed and 18 wounded.”… Page 3: “SHARP SAYS U.S. FORCE IS READY FOR ANYTHING:… “Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, the military commander in the Pacific, said yesterday that American forces in Vietnam were well-deployed to take care of anything the enemy might try. He said enemy forces were set up so they could continue their harassment at Khe Sanh ‘or they could have a major offensive at Hue or they could take another try at Saigon.’ The Admiral …declared that the enemy would be in ‘for some real surprises’ if he tries anything.’… Page 3: “3 Newsmen Hurt at Khe Sanh”… “Three journalists were injured in the bombardment of Khe Sanh yesterday: Bill Branigan and Jim Deckard of ABC and Miss Jurate Kazickas of the North American Newspaper Alliance.”
Page 1: “SENATE VOTES END OF RACE BARRIERS IN 80% OF HOUSING--Rights Compromise Backed By 61 to 19 With Final Action Set For Monday–Stiff Penalties Added–Negro Protection Approved Along With Antitrust Curb And Ban On Indian Bias”… Page 1: “GOLD BUYING AT NEW PEAK AS RUMORS SWEEP EUROPE--75 to 100 Tons Sold In Day–Attention Turns To Basel Parly–U.S. Gets $200 Million From International Money fund To Cut Losses”… Page 27: “27 Found Dead In Salt Mine On Island Off Coast of Louisiana”… Page 1: “Columbia University Studies Heroin On Campus”...
Page 1: “FIRST COMBAT DUTY FOR F-111s IS DUE IN NEXT FEW DAYS”… “The controversial F-111 plane is going to Vietnam, where it will engage in combat for the first time. Within the next week six F-111 fighter-bombers will takeoff from Nellis Air Force Base, outside Las Vegas, Nevada, where they have gone through intensive trials for several months. They will stop for fuel at Guam and continue to Takhli Air Base in Thailand…. the Air Force regards its model as by far the best tactical bomber in the world. The principal advantage of the F-111 in raids on North Vietnam military men say, is the highly automated navigation system, designed to permit it to hit targets in bad weather and darkness.”…
9 March 1968… THE PRESIDENT’s DAILY BRIEF… VIETNAM: Fighting has been light in South Vietnam except in northeastern Quang Tri Province, where there have been sharp clashes… In provincial and district towns in nearly all parts of South Vietnam,… Communist harassment is keeping the populace apprehensive and is reducing the confidence in the government... NORTH VIETNAM: Repairs are underway on the Paul Doumer bridge. Photography of 7 February, which has just been given a detailed review in Washington, showed that dropped bridge sections on the east end of the Doumer bridge had been spanned by means of steel cables up to 500 feet long resting on intermediate supports. It can not be determined as yet if the Communists intend to repair the bridge permanently, but cables have been used previously to aid reconstruction work. The cables may be intended, however, for constructing a highway cable bridge or pedestrian walk using the bridge piers for anchorage. There are no lengthy cable bridges being used for rail traffic in North Vietnam. Seven spans of the mile long 19-span bridge are either dropped or damaged, and considerable work remains before the bridge could be opened to even limited traffic. There are 16 alternate rail and highway crossings over which traffic can move in and out of Hanoi. … Hanoi: French report on Monday’s raid on Hanoi: The Paris newspaper Le Monde carried a story this week claiming that after the air strike on Hanoi on Monday , ‘The Americans can no longer say that their aircraft attack only military targets.’ The raid on Monday, the article goes on, was aimed at a rice hulling factory and the surrounding workers houses. One wonders, the article concludes, ‘whether Washington has not decided to take a new step in escalation.’
9 MARCH 1968… OPERATION ROLLING THUNDER… New York Times (10 Mar reporting 9 Mar ops) Page 1: “Only 57 missions were flown against North Vietnam yesterday…The bad weather restricted targets to the panhandle southward of Vinh, where the airfield was struck. In a preliminary report that a rail yard at Langgini, 70 miles north-east of Hanoi and about 25 miles from the Chinese Communist border, had been bombed by radar-guided Air Force planes. Navy air crews struck near Thanh Hoa, a port and transshipment point about 100 miles south of Haiphong.”… “Vietnam: Air Losses” (Chris Hobson) There were no fixed wing aircraft lost in Southeast Asia on 9 March 1968… Humble host flew #115…led a flight of four A-4Fs to bomb troops a click or two south of Khe Sanh under FAC control… dropped my four MK-82s where the smoke was… no visible opposition. Tactics in Khe Sanh area permit a lower pullout… Rollin, 12,000-feet, 45-degree dive, pickle at 4,000-feet and out by about 2,000 to 2,500-feet.
RIPPLE SALVO… #734… The New York Times message to the President on the mid-course correction to resolve the Vietnam conundrum. VIETNAM REASSESSMENT… I quote…
“The politico-strategic debate within the Administration over what to do next in Vietnam undoubtedly will lead the country deeper into disaster if it continues to focus on means rather than ends. The ‘means’ that are being debated are American troops–
(See Historical Document 115, telegram from Wheeler to Westmoreland)
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v06/d115
“General Westmoreland wants more of them, which is natural. It is unlikely they will be denied to him in the current crisis any more than in the recurrent crisis of the past. The question is how many more. This, in an election year, unavoidably involves the President in broader considerations.
“If, as the Pentagon claims, not enough additional troops can be squeezed put of existing forces in the United States, then two issues evaded by the policy of gradual escalation over the past three years–a limited reserve call-up and, possibly, wider mobilization–may have to be faced. A significant reserve call-up for this unpopular war is bound to have unfavorable political consequences for the Administration. More important, it might stir enough added dissent to reduce public support for the war effort below an acceptable minimum level, a reality the generals themselves cannot ignore.
“In these circumstances, a larger mobilization that also mobilized the country’s war spirit might have fewer psychological risks. But the White House is worried by the least for the economic controls, profit-sharing taxes and other measures that would have to accompany mobilization. There would be the danger of a boomerang or at least bitter debate–stimulated in part by memories of the way the Congress was stampeded into the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Any probe of these avenues naturally takes the Administration right back to Question No. 1, re-phrased: Can the requirement for added troops be reduced to a number that might be found, through some sleight of hand, without a substantial reserve call-up? And this analysis of ‘means’ leads inevitably to fundamental questions of strategy.
“Three possible strategic courses are being debated within the Administration, according to Times military correspondent William Beecher. One strategy is that of employing ‘whatever power resources are necessary to prevail.’ It would involve large troop increases–40,000 to 50,000 reserves at a minimum, plus readiness to call up another 100,000 or more.
“A second possible course is described as that of patching up present strategy. It would avoid mobilization and simply provide General Westmoreland with a few ‘tens of thousands’ of additional troops for use as a strategic reserve and to open key highways. South Vietnamese troops would be relied upon for an increased role in protecting the cities and other populated areas, while American troops continue the effort to defeat major enemy units in border areas, such as Kansas.
“One of these two courses probably will be adopted–and perhaps both, since the second course may lead right on to the first. But this unappetizing prospect has led to consideration of a third possible strategy. This strategy comes in varied versions, but its principal characteristic currently is represented by the Pentagon’s ‘anti-Khe Sanh’ school.
“This group holds that it is self-defeating to defend static,isolated posts in unpopular regions so close to border sanctuaries that the enemy, at its own initiative, can mass whatever forces it wishes without fear of attacks on its rear areas except through aerial bombing. This thought underlies that judgment: Unless the United States is prepared to invade North Vietnam and Laos on the ground as a means of enveloping attacking forces–a course that would require a million American troops and could bring China into the war–such battles should be engaged only in areas deep enough without South Vietnam to permit American forces to employ mobile tactics in which they excel. A pull-back from the borders would permit more American military protection of the country’s populated areas. There would be less emphasis on search-and-destroy missions and more on clear-and-hold operations designed to speed pacification.
“This strategy, some military planners believe, would cut the recent United States casualty rate in half yet permit more progress in pacification, an objective that has far more to do with success in Vietnam than casualties inflicted on Communist troops. One drawback of this strategy, its advocates say, is that it probably would rule out a ‘clear-cut military victory.’ But has such a ‘victory’ ever been in the cards? Has not the central confusion in Washington’s thinking about Vietnam been precisely the assumption at every sign of progress that a military victory could be achieved and might even be in the offing?
“Th true allied capability–one that has existed from the beginning of American intervention–is that of denying victory to the Communists. Stalemate is the military reality in Vietnam. And stalemate requires ultimate acceptance of a political compromise, since there is no other realistic alternative for either side.
“What the Administration needs to do first in its current review is to clarify its own political ends. The question of reinforcements, whether in small or large numbers is to help achieve a settlement rather than to pursue the will-of-the-wisp of victory.”…End quote…
Humble Host has completed his reassessment and presented a strategy for victory. FIND-FIX-FIGHT-FOLLOW-AND FINISH. If it means crossing borders and clearing out sanctuaries, so be it… Our enemies then, Vietnam, and now, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, wherever, base their strategies on enjoying the advantages of sanctuaries knowing Americans play by ridiculous self-imposed restrictions that preclude victory. That’s our rep. Our “professional reputation.” Colonel Joseph D. Celeski, U.S.Army, retired, published an essay, “Attacking Insurgent Spaces: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction” in the Army War College “Military Review,” November-December, 2006 that concludes:
“Allowing insurgents untrammeled use of sanctuaries and the freedom to cross borders enables them to sustain and prolong their rebellion. Whether sanctuaries are permitted willingly or unwittingly by the host nation should not deter the counter-insurgents from attacking, either kinetically of along other security lines of operation. Counter-insurgents do not have to destroy the sanctuary, they can also succeed by disrupting of denying sanctuary and free border transit. When they do the latter, they can seize the initiative from the insurgents and dictate the tempo of combat.
“The path to successful counter-sanctuary campaign lies through the conduct of a well-planned effect-based offensive designed to achieve desired outcomes. Such a campaign must be executed with tailored forces conducting parallel attacks in concert with other lines of operation. the multi-pronged approach will strip away the advantages the enemy gains by hiding behind another country’s border: it can turn the sanctuary and the remote border area from a temporary resting spot for insurgents into a final one. In the end, the message is clear: dry up the insurgency, dry up the sanctuary.”…
Put Humble Host down for the strategy that overwhelms and destroys an enemy where ever he is. FIND-FIX-FIGHT-FOLLOW and FINISH. And if the choice to go to war falls short of FINISH, then we should stay home…. The surest path to victory in war is to be so big, bad, dominant and all-powerful that no nation or rogue will have the urge to try you on. Deterrence of war is the only way to win a war. Weakness, real or perceived is what invites the conditions that lead to war. As Sun Tzu put it “The acme of skill is to win without fighting.”
Lest we forget…. Bear
