Bear Taylor 
COMMEMORATING THE 50th ANNIVERSARY OF THE VIETNAM WAR (1961-1973)… and honoring the intrepid Naval Aviators, Naval Flight Officers and air crewmen who carried the air war into the heartland of North Vietnam in the years of Operation Rolling Thunder (1965-1968)…
GOOD MORNING. Faithful Scribe has a “twice told tale to tell”. WHEN NAVAL AVIATION ROARED. Tale #18, first told in my RTR post on the 50th anniversary of the USS CORAL SEA/CVW-15 strike on the “bridges of Haiphong” on 17 September 1967, was an abbreviated version of the CINCPACFLT document from which I drew the facts and details of the mission. (Refer to the RTR archives, search posts from September 1967, and troll down to the 18 September post, “Isolating Haiphong from the Hinterland.” See Ripple Salvo #561 therein for the short version of the CVW-15 18 Sept 1967 tale.) A more complete version of the mission follows, and is a verbatim account of the original documents I located in 1985 at the Navy Annex in Suitland, Maryland. This is but one of thousands of such documents contained in eight cardboard boxes and marked for disposal and destruction that I discovered after a six-month search. I was able to obtain temporary custody of the eight cartons of CINCPACFLT Vietnam War award recommendation and approval documents. Originally classified as Secret or Confidential, all were stamped with the notation “downgraded at three-year intervals, declassified after twelve years.” The collection was an orphan, and I was able to give the eight boxes two months of “foster care.” During this period I was able to duplicate by notes and copies several hundred of the declassified reports of Naval Aviation strike operations during the years of Rolling Thunder. My effort preserved only about 25% of the entire cache of historical documents. Months after returning the eight cartons of one-of-a-kind pages of history to Suitland, I learned that the collection of originals including maps, photographs and eye-witness testimony, had been destroyed on schedule and in spite of my recommendation to the custodian of the collection that the eight cartons of precious documents be preserved in perpetuity. Not everybody has a “sense of history.”
(Webmaster note: Sickening! The people who ordered and carried out the destruction of those records should be ashamed!)
Several thousand Naval Aviation award recommendations containing the “summaries of action” and the names and actions of Rolling Thunder participants that I had obtained were delivered to the Vietnam Archives at Texas Tech University in 2004 and are retained there in the Rear Admiral Jeremy Taylor collection. I have retained about 200 of the documents from 1967 operations, which are the source for my weekly “When Naval Aviation Roared” posts for this website.
The text of the 17 September 1967 USS CORAL SEA/CVW-15 awards recommendation submitted by Commanding Officer, USS CORAL SEA on 11 January 1968, and endorsed by COMSEVENTHFLT on 12 February 1968, is presented here as “Tale #18” and representative of the collection available at the Texas Tech Vietnam Archives… Quote…
“On 17 September 1967 the USS CORAL SEA (CVA-43) strike group was scheduled as the second major assault force of the day to attack two major railway bridges in Haiphong, North Vietnam. The primary target assigned was the formidable Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge, a double, through truss, steel bridge, 300-feet long by 20-feet wide with highway passage on the lower deck and a one-meter gauge railway on the upper deck. This bridge was particularly significant as it provided the only railway access to the port facility of Haiphong, the major transshipment point for all North Vietnam. Its destruction would seriously hamper the logistic efforts within the country. The second bridge was a 300×25 bowstring truss highway bridge of six spans, a concrete deck, and a vertical lift center span to enable water traffic to pass. These two bridges were vital links in the railway and highway systems linking Haiphong to Hanoi, from whence all logistic flow southward toward South Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail originated. Destruction of these arteries would seriously effect the North Vietnamese ability to wage war. In defense of this strategic area, the enemy had deployed 22 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, eight of which were known to be occupied, and 61 antiaircraft artillery (AAA) sites, 23 of which were known occupied. Additionally, untold numbers of automatic weapons were in place throughout the area to force the strike aircraft up into the highest surface-to-air missile threat altitudes. Recent experience by pilots flying over these sites indicated that the gunners were well-trained and could provide accurate tracking, sector and barrage antiaircraft fire. An enemy aircraft threat was also prevalent due to the fact that Kien An Airfield located south of the city was able to support the most modern Sin0-Soviet jet aircraft, and the bridge targets were well within the range of MiGs operating from Phuc Yen Airfield north of Haiphong. Pre-strike planning emphasis was placed on tactics to best divide, suppress and evade the AAA/SAM threat are summarized as follows:
a. To divide the enemy fire, the CORAL SEA strike force would split in two basic groups for an attack from the north, and the other to proceed straight in for an attack from the south.
b. To suppress the enemy fire, Iron Hand elements were to launch their weapons against known occupied SAM sites at Coast-in-Point in an effort to prevent them from employing their radars and associated guidance equipment. From there, the Iron Handers would set up defensive patterns to the southeast and southwest of the target to cover the balance of the attack and egress phases of the strike aircraft at CIP and bomb known AAA sites or those observed to be firing. These suppression attacks were to be timed so that their bombs would detonate just as the strike aircraft commenced their attacks. In addition, the CORAL SEA strike group planned to closely follow a USS INTREPID (CVS-11) Alpha Strike on the Haiphong Railroad yards west of the city in order to take advantage of the opportunity to further divide the enemy fire.
c. To evade enemy fire, formations were set forth that would permit junking and yet still retain group integrity. Spacing between separate aircraft, sections and divisions to prevent multiple casualties from a SAM detonation was set forth in detail and based on approved and practiced VX-5 defensive tactics. The importance and use of DECM equipment in the target area was also brought out. The strike group commander launched at 1240 local, and rendezvoused over the carrier. The INTREPID/CVW-10 strike force launched simultaneously and rendezvoused over INTREPID. In-flight refueling was accomplished over the force for those aircraft so requiring and departure enroute was then taken, utilizing vectors and communications assistance from the E-2A aircraft. Heavy cloud cover precluded visual navigation enroute, so the escorting F-4B aircraft provided additional radar vectors which permitted coast-in precisely at the predetermined and briefed point. The CORAL SEA/CVW-15 strike force fell in five miles astern of the INTRPID/CVW-10 group prior to coast-in as both groups headed for their respective targets in the Haiphong complex. At this point the CORAL SEA northern strike group (six A-4 strike, two A-4 Iron Hand and two F-4 flak suppression aircraft) led by CDR Verlyn DANIELS detached and proceeded in a northerly arc around the city of Haiphong. The southern strike element (five A-4 strike, two A-4 Iron Hand, two F-4 flak suppression aircraft) led by CDR Tom WOOLCOCK coasted in just south of Cat Bi Airfield and immediately encountered heavy enemy antiaircraft fire. The assigned Iron Hand aircraft, led by LCDR Bill COOK (south) and LCDR Harold BARNHART (north), fired Shrike missiles to suppress the most threatening of the surface-to-air missile sites.
d. The coordinated split attack on the two bridges by the CORAL SEA bombers went as planned with all bombers maintained formation integrity in the face of intense enemy AAA and executed devastatingly precise attacks on the bridges with all bombs observed to cover the bridges. No bombs were observed to impact in the nearby residential areas adjoining the approaches to the two bridges. Enemy fire was described as accurate and intense by the dive bombers but no aircraft were hit in the bold attack. The SAM activity amounted to activated radar and two SAMs that were observed by the VFP-63 RF-8 on his post strike BDA run a few minutes after the strike force egressed from the target to go ballistic and explode harmlessly.
e. Assessment of the post strike photographs showed superior results. One approach span and one over water span on the Highway Bridge was clearly dropped. The east and west approaches to this bridge were also completely destroyed. The previously undamaged south end of the railroad/highway bridge was heavily damaged with holes in both decks of the bridge making the structure unusable. Both approaches to this bridge were also severely interdicted.
“This Air Wing FIFTEEN major assault against the Railroad/Highway Bridge, Haiphong, North Vietnam on 17 September 1967 was one of the strikes referred to in COMSEVENTHFLT’s Confidential message of 20 Sept 67, which is quoted in full:
‘Key targets in the plan to isolate Haiphong from the hinterland are the highway and railroad bridges located in the environs of the port city. It is noted that a significant advance towards the realization of our objectives has been achieved by the CORAL SEA and the sharpshooters of CVW-15 dropping of the west span and east approach ramp of the Haiphong highway bridge and the cratering of the highway/railroad bridge. A special note has been taken and the determination and aggressiveness of CTG77-3 forces of Task Force 77 during operations on 17 and 18 September while striking targets in heavily defended Haiphong complex on six different occasions. The excellent results achieved are a fitting tribute to your teamwork, dedication and courage. Well done!’ /s/ ADM John J. HYLAND… ” End of quote…
BITS OF RIBBON. The award of the DISTINGUISHED FLYING CROSS for extraordinary heroism on the 17 September CORAL SEA strike was recommended for CDR Thomas E. WOOLCOCK, XO, VA-153; LTJG David W. READ, VA-155; LTJG Phillip K. SHERMAN, VFP-63; CDR Verlyne W. DANIELS, VA-155; ENSIGN Frederick J. FORTNER, VA-155; and LCDR William. P. COOK, VA-155.
In addition, COMSEVENTHFLT approved individual AIR MEDALS for CDR Richard J. SHULTE, LCDR George W. McDONALD and LTJG Tonu PLAKK. NAVY COMMENDATION MEDALS with Combat Distinguishing Device were approved for LT Gary L. STARBIRD and LTJG Jon R. HOLDER.
Despite the success, heroics and acknowledgment of the courage and aggressiveness of the CVW-15 strike pilots, COMSEVENTHFLT “approved no award for the below listed personnel, however, the mission described in the CORAL SEA recommendations for awards may be used for Strike Credit towards eligibility for the Air Medal under the Strike Flight System.” In other words, two points. One tenth of a Strike Flight Air Medal… Twelve brave, bold tailhookers got no ribbon that day… CDR Bobbie Williams, LCDR Daniel O’Connell, LCDR Charles Earnest, LT Gary Holmes, LTJG Kenneth Middleton, LTJG Samuel Harris; LTJG Joseph Dantone, LCDR Lorraine Renner, LCDR Harold Barnett, LTJG Eugene Giffen, LTJG Robert Tracy and LT Richard Stearns… I guess the 7th Fleet Awards board didn’t get the message from their boss, ADM HYLAND….
All are remembered here with high respect and enduring admiration…
NEXT POST. Tale #19. LCDR Ray FOX and his VA-34 nugget wingmen wipe out a lucrative target ten miles north of Haiphong Harbor with verve and guts that will water your eyes. Their story from an especially memorable flight on 7 November 1967….
Lest we forget… Bear
