Bear Taylor 
Good Morning… Day EIGHTEEN of our look back to Operation Rolling Thunder… FIFTY years ago…
18 MARCH 1966 (NYT)… ON THE HOMEFRONT… A fair and mild Friday in New York and Washington was in the middle of a big high with clear skies. Page 1 of the NYT lead article came from Hue, SVN where the Northern Buddhists rallied in support of the ousted rival of Cao Ky. General Thi was being hailed in Hue and the dissent in I Corps was spreading… Also on page 1 was news that the H-bomb missing in the loss of a B-52 in a January midair with a tanker had been found in the sea off Palomares, Spain. Let the recovery by the Navy begin. ..On page 3 a short paragraph: “North Vietnamese regular troops are operating within 40 miles of Saigon… Article on the President’s activities on the 17th: (1) a long meeting with the Civil Service Commission dealing with the government’s Equal Opportunity Program; (2) met with the Irish Ambassador William Fay who was delivering a St. Patrick’s Day greeting to the White House; and, (3) continued the discussions with SecState on NATO. The President later participated in the Savings Bond Program for government employees… In California the Watts area was calm, but Gubernatorial candidate Ronald Reagan was assailing Governor Brown for being out-of-town and staying there while the trouble was brewing on March 15…On the sports page, Sam Snead had the early lead in the Citrus Open, purse $110,000, in Orlando. Jack Nicklaus was three back and Gary Player and Arnold Palmer were further back with 76s.
18 MARCH 1966…ROLLING THUNDER …. VMCJ-1 of MAG-11 operating our of Danang lost an EF-10B Skynight ECM aircraft with a crew of two, 1LT EVERETT ALVIN McPHERSON and 1LT BRENT EDEN DAVIS, Killed in Action while providing support for an Air Force Rolling Thunder strike 10-miles west of Thanh Hoa. The Skynight aircraft was orbiting at 25,000-feet 45-miles SW of the city when hit and shattered. Both SAM and 85mm AAA were active in the area. No chutes were observed and a SAR effort failed to find the aircraft or either of the crew. In 1993 local villagers found the wreckage and the remains of one of the crew. The crash site was evacuated in two operations in 1995 and 1997, the remains of 1lt DAVIS were identified, and he was buried in Arlington on 8 December 1997. 1LT McPHERSON’s body was never found or recovered. It is thought that he was able to eject but his parachute did not open. Gone, but not forgotten. In truth, we leave a lot of aviators behind.
RIPPLE SALVO… A BALL IN HIS EAR… President Johnson maintained a circle of trusted advisors throughout the war. In time they became the Tuesday Lunch group. They provided the President a full spectrum of advice with Hawks like SecDef and the JCS on one side, and the most dovish of Doves, Under Secretary of State George Ball on the other. George Ball had the President’s ear and he was the voice of caution that every executive needs in his inner circle. Ball took advantage of the 38-day bombing pause of Dec 65 lasting to the end of Jan 66 to draft a long memorandum for the President that provided the President his analysis of where the conflict was, had been, and where it would go when the President selected any one of his several options. No sugar coating by Secretary Ball, ever. Here is the first paragraph of his 25 January 1966:
“I recognize the difficulty and complexity of the problem and I do not wish to add to your burdens. But before a final decision is made on this critical issue, I feel an obligation to amplify and document my strong conviction: that sustained bombing of North Viet-Nam will more than likely lead us into war with Red Chins–probably in six to nine months. And it may well involve at least a limited war with the Soviet Union.”
Ball’s analysis held that the U.S.”…had a philosophy of bombing that requires gradual escalation,” and that gradual escalation would inexorably lead to war with the PRC and possibly the Soviets. His explanation:
“…we have never had a generally agreed rationale for bombing North Viet-Nam. But the inarticulate major premise has always been that bombing will somehow, some day, and in some manner, create pressure on Hanoi to stop the war. This is accepted as an article of faith, not only by the military who have planning and operational responsibilities, but by most civilian advocates of bombing in the Administration.
“Yet it is also widely accepted that for bombing to have the desired political effect, we must gradually extend our attack to increasingly vital targets. In this way– it is contended– we will constantly threaten Hanoi that if it continues its aggression it will face mounting costs– with the destruction of its economic life at the end of the road.”
Ball identified the four target sets that the escalation would inevitably lead to, any one of which would result in a major confrontation with either the PRC or the Soviet Union. The four targets: mining the Haiphong harbor, and destroying the POL supplies of NVN, the power systems, and the airfields, all of which had already been suggested for targeting by SecDef and the JCS. He presented the range of reactions and consequences for escalating Rolling Thunder to include these targets. Ball made no recommendation despite his strong case that the United States should not resume Rolling Thunder in February 1966. The Ball memorandum of 25 January 1966 served its purpose– the President’s decision was to recommence Rolling Thunder on 31 January, but he declined, for the time being, to approve any extension or escalation of air operations, despite the strongest recommendations of the military and milder recommendations of SecDef. Rolling Thunder was to be more of the same in 1966.
Lest we forget. Bear
–30–
